Al Sadr

[KSC]

Before the US reclaimed Sadr City several months ago, Sadr had a secondary support group that was little known. Non-extremist Shias in the Sadr City/New Baghdad area loved al Sadr for his work to keep the Sunni terrorists under control in the east of Baghdad. They disliked his attacks on coalition forces, but tolerated them in exchange for sleeping well and being able to comfortable go to the market under the watchful eye of armed militia men that kept the streets safe from terror and suicide attacks.

After the US moved back into Sadr City and the Mahdi Army underground, in came the Sunni extremists. The terror attacks began, and a rift was formed in the militia. Those with no desire to attack the coalition disbanded with Sadr, since his claimed protection was no longer realized. Others with an underlying hate of the Americans were strengthened under his cause and fought harder (and probably died or were terribly wounded) trying to convince the US that Sadr City was not for them.

After he told the militia to go underground and stop hostilities with the coalition, hardline militants broke away completely and formed smaller independant cells (which, without sponorship of a larger organization are almost always short lived or crushed).

So, as you can see, there is no magic stance that one man can assume to gain power or strength or this volitile situation. These stories are the same in all of the past Mahdi Army strongholds- Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, and Sadr City. Sadr City, in my opinion, is the last bastion of the Mahdi Army. With every decision he makes he loses some and gains others. The Militia is manned by extremely poor, angry Shias- mostly in their younger years. So, although the Sadr City militia wing may be the most well armed and supplied, I'd be willing to bet they are not as dedicated as the other branches we have fought in the past.

Karbala and Najaf holds the poorest of the poor Shias in Iraq, living almost on faith alone- staying there just to be close to the shrines. Sadr City is a cess pool of humanity and instead of being driven by faith, they are driven by pent up anger and emotion, grandfathered into the fight simply because that's how they believe it's done. After the surge in Baghdad clears out the Mahdi Army, I'd be willing to bet they don't return again, they have nowhere left to go.

Al Sadr simply took advantage of the anger the Shias had. He is believed to be a descendant of Mohammed, since Shia Imams are said to be of Mohammed blood line, and his father was Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al Sadr. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is now the premier Shia cleric in Iraq. His teaching and guidance encourages Shia involvement in gov't and denounces violence. Therefore, followers of al Sadr cannot claim themselves in good standing as Shias.

A devout Shia interpreter from New Baghdad once told me, "Saddam did many bad things, but also did some good. He killed Ayatollah al-Sadr and left Ayatollah al-Sistani in power. Too bad he couldn't forsee Muqtada's future. Iraq suffers with one al-Sadr, imagine Iraq with two."

[Pete S]

Although I agree that eliminating al Sadr is not on option presently, there needs to be a plan in action to replace him.
I am very irritated with the leniency the US and Iraqi governments have given him.

[Deadhead 63A1]

Originally Posted by KSC

Before the US reclaimed Sadr City several months ago, Sadr had a secondary support group that was little known. Non-extremist Shias in the Sadr City/New Baghdad area loved al Sadr for his work to keep the Sunni terrorists under control in the east of Baghdad. They disliked his attacks on coalition forces, but tolerated them in exchange for sleeping well and being able to comfortable go to the market under the watchful eye of armed militia men that kept the streets safe from terror and suicide attacks.

After the US moved back into Sadr City and the Mahdi Army underground, in came the Sunni extremists. The terror attacks began, and a rift was formed in the militia. Those with no desire to attack the coalition disbanded with Sadr, since his claimed protection was no longer realized. Others with an underlying hate of the Americans were strengthened under his cause and fought harder (and probably died or were terribly wounded) trying to convince the US that Sadr City was not for them.

After he told the militia to go underground and stop hostilities with the coalition, hardline militants broke away completely and formed smaller independant cells (which, without sponorship of a larger organization are almost always short lived or crushed).

So, as you can see, there is no magic stance that one man can assume to gain power or strength or this volitile situation. These stories are the same in all of the past Mahdi Army strongholds- Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, and Sadr City. Sadr City, in my opinion, is the last bastion of the Mahdi Army. With every decision he makes he loses some and gains others. The Militia is manned by extremely poor, angry Shias- mostly in their younger years. So, although the Sadr City militia wing may be the most well armed and supplied, I'd be willing to bet they are not as dedicated as the other branches we have fought in the past.

Karbala and Najaf holds the poorest of the poor Shias in Iraq, living almost on faith alone- staying there just to be close to the shrines. Sadr City is a cess pool of humanity and instead of being driven by faith, they are driven by pent up anger and emotion, grandfathered into the fight simply because that's how they believe it's done. After the surge in Baghdad clears out the Mahdi Army, I'd be willing to bet they don't return again, they have nowhere left to go.

Al Sadr simply took advantage of the anger the Shias had. He is believed to be a descendant of Mohammed, since Shia Imams are said to be of Mohammed blood line, and his father was Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al Sadr. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is now the premier Shia cleric in Iraq. His teaching and guidance encourages Shia involvement in gov't and denounces violence. Therefore, followers of al Sadr cannot claim themselves in good standing as Shias.

A devout Shia interpreter from New Baghdad once told me, "Saddam did many bad things, but also did some good. He killed Ayatollah al-Sadr and left Ayatollah al-Sistani in power. Too bad he couldn't forsee Muqtada's future. Iraq suffers with one al-Sadr, imagine Iraq with two."

A very profound insight into the heart of the current situation. I was going to add my two cents but I think I'll wait for a more appropriate time and setting. Suffice it to say that many of those hardline, breakaway Sadrists have found the sponsorship of a larger organization and the result is worse than that with which we were dealing before.