Insurgencies and Small Unit Tactics

Since this is my first post I will start off with an introduction. I enlisted in the army with a RIP contract in 2002. I was fortunate enough to deploy with 1/75 into both Afghanistan and Iraq. Late 2003 I was accepted into a commissioning program and couldn't turn it down.

While still working towards my commission I earned the chance to go through SFAS with class 007-05. I had the best experience of my life and it only wetted my appetite to continue the training. Sadly, I have to wait until after I graduate and reach O-2 (P).....

Currently I'm finishing up a summer internship in England. I'm working with the Advanced Research and Assessment Group (ARAG) which is part of their Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC). I am doing research for a paper on a "business model for small unit tactics", whatever that means....which brings me to the point of my post:

Looking at historical examples of world powers engaged with insurgent forces (TE Lawrence in the Middle East, France in Indochina and Algiers, USSR in Afghanistan, US in Vietnam), we can see several patterns. Namely, with the exception of TE Lawrence, each power chose to engage the insurgency as they would a conventional force. This was met with disastrous results, without exception.

Additionally, we see another important pattern. During their respective conflicts, each nation used, to one degree or another, irregular or unconventional forces. In each case, this approach was far more successful then conventional tactics.

Sadly, another pattern is that each nation failed to learn from each other or themselves or to apply those lessons to future conflicts.

This all brings me to the question I pose to you in order to get some more insight into my article. If you agree that irregular or unconventional forces (not just limited to SF but including SEALs, Rangers, etc.) have an advantage over conventional forces against insurgents, how do they have this advantage and why?

What I want to do is show how unconventional forces have an advantage in the war on terror, and then make recommendations for conventional forces so that they can optimize their performance.

This is in no way an "us vs. them", "down with the conventional, or 'big' army" article. I'm simply trying to apply the unconventional model that has been so successful against insurgencies in the past to how our conventional units are structured and hopefully find ways to make them work better.

Thanks for your time; your input will be put to good use.