This recently published report is about an incident which occurred in 2004, where a British platoon, low on ammo, conducted a bayonet charge.
Here is the summary:
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In May 2004, approximately 20 British troops in Basra were ambushed and forced out of their vehicles by about 100 Shiite militia fighters. When ammunition ran low, the British troops fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. About 20 militiamen were killed in the assault without any British deaths.
The bayonet charge appeared to succeed for three main reasons. First, the attack was the first of its kind in that region and captured the element of surprise. Second, enemy fighters probably believed jihadist propaganda stating that coalition troops were cowards unwilling to fight in close combat, further enhancing the element of surprise. Third, the strict discipline of the British troops overwhelmed the ability of the militia fighters to organize a cohesive counteraction.
The effects of this tactical action in Basra are not immediately applicable elsewhere, but an important dominant theme emerges regarding the need to avoid predictable patterns of behavior within restrictive rules of engagement. Commanders should keep adversaries off balance with creative feints and occasional shows of force lest they surrender the initiative to the enemy.
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While this incident is perhaps historically interesting, I don’t think the effectiveness of the bayonet is the take-away, however.
I think this is the important part:
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At the least, this case study suggests the importance of changing tactics and procedures to keep enemy fighters off balance. Even within restrictive rules of engagement, commanders should seek periodic “spike” actions that prevent coalition procedures from becoming routine and easily predictive.
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Read the whole report here (requires AKO access)
https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collab...?doid=14903470
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