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Originally Posted by Molon Labe
What I want to do is show how unconventional forces have an advantage in the war on terror, and then make recommendations for conventional forces so that they can optimize their performance.
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You realize of course that in insurgencies that the military application of force is often counterproductive when used as the main tool to solve the problem. Counterinsurgency operations require a multidisciplinary effort where the military plays a supporting and not a leading role. The largest problem with conventional forces is that they are formed, trained, equipped and led to address force on force issues against formations they can see and doctrines that they can understand. Unconventional forces (and I will limit myself only to SF here) deal with and understand cultural aspects of the problem and know what buttons to push to bring the appropriate actions (both directly and indirectly) needed to address not only the causes of the insurgency but the supporting aspects that keep it going. I know that this is not what you are looking for as far as specifics, but what you are asking for will take more time than I have available right now to discuss. You also realize, I am sure, that there is no cookie cutter approach where one size fits all when it comes to insurgencies and the "model" will have to adapt to a great number of variables for each specific situation and some very serious assumptions that may or may not be valid. I have never been a big fan of modeling as many seem to oversimplify very complicated situations and become a crutch for folks to see solutions without digging deep enough to fully grasp the problem to begin with.