[Roguish Lawyer]

[continued]

Subversive insurgents seek to penetrate the political structure of the government to control it and use it for their own purposes. They selectively use violence to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. The political arm of the insurgent organization, while maneuvering for control of the existing political structure, directs the military arm to conduct carefully planned and coordinated violence. (14: Chapt 9,10) Employment of violence is designed to show the system to be incompetent and to provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy. A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment which allows the insurgents to use both legal and illegal methods to accomplish their goals. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930s is an example of this model. When conditions dictate, this type of insurgency can quickly shift to the critical-cell pattern.

In the critical cell model, the insurgents also seek to infiltrate the government's institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from within. The use of violence remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by the armed force. One variation of this pattern is when the insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government, then emerges to direct the formation of a new government. The Sandanistas' takeover of the Nicaraguan revolution provides a excellent example of this type of critical-cell model. Another variation is seen in the Cuban revolution and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban model) insurgency.

This model involves a single, armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to establish control and erect new institutions.



Unlike the two previous models, mass-oriented insurgents emphasize the creation of a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. These insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefully determine their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government. The communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely difficult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.

The final model is the traditional insurgency. It differs from the other types of insurgencies because it normally grows from very specific grievances and initially has limited goals. The traditional insurgency involves tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups who perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldomly seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency.

Another means of analyzing the nature of an insurgency is by recognizing that they develop through common phases. Though FM 100-20 does not identify specific phases, it states: (4: 2-4)

Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of
development. Not all insurgences experience every phase, and
progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for
success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase of development in other regions of a country or theater. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earler phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return.

Insurgencies are not sudden events. They occur over an extended period of time. Their beginnings usually go unnoticed, progressing and growing to the enventual overthrow of a government. FMFM 8-2 organizes the insurgency into three stages: (5: 11-14) The Passive Stage, the Active Stage, and the Counteroffensive Stage. These stages are similar in nature to Mao Tse-Tung's strategy which develops through three phases: (7: 20-22) Latent and Incipient Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, and War of Movement.

The first stage (or phase) of the insurgency is the initial period of the conflict and is the most difficult and protracted. During this phase the insurgents establish an infrastructure, actively recruit, focus on gaining popular support, and demonstate that they can provide a better alternative to the existing government. Preservation is emphasized to ensure the completion of the necessary political and military preparations for the succeeding stages. Many of the activities of the first stage are continued in the subsequent stages.

The second stage is initiated to extend political control and increase military action in armed resistance against government forces. The organization continues to expand. Emphasis is shifted to establishing insurgent-controlled areas and providing an alternate government structure. The insurgents use guerrilla warfare to tie down and frustrate government security forces while building their own military force. Through additional acts of terrorism, inciting civil disobedience, inciting labor strikes, and promoting general disorder among the people, the insurgents cause the government to lose confidence in its ability to control the situation.


The final stage of the insurgency occurs when the insurgents believe they have gained sufficient military strength and popular
support to meet and defeat the government forces tn decisive combat. The characteristics of this combat are more conventional in nature; however, guerrilla action continues in order to assist in the eventual defeat of the government's military forces.


In the recent war against Iraq, our military forces achieved a remarkable victory. We enjoyed a technological advantage. We dominated our enemy both tactically and operationally. We fought an enemy who quickly lost his will to fight. The insurgency/counterinsurgency battlefield will be different. Our technology can be effectively neutralized. Our enemy will likely have the tactical and operational advantage. More importantly, the insurgent is willing to fight a protracted struggle, patiently using time to his advantage. Military leaders must appreciate the compexities of this type of conflict to determine effective courses of action. This appreciation must start with a basic understanding of the nature of an insurgency.


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