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A. Force Protection (FORCPRO).
1) Passive: SOF operates across the globe and in the vast majority of instances with other conventional US forces/elements. SOF specific ammunition and/or weapons systems single out SOF as someone special and instantly raises them on the “watch or hit” list. It will be said that this is true regardless of the weapon or ammunition and that SOF typically dress differently and uses a variety of unique equipment. While this is true in some cases, a special weapon is always of higher interest to the enemy. Should the same platform be retained and converted to 6.8mm the immediate visual detection will be eliminated, however ammunition storage and handling will yield interest at some point and within a period of time identify SOF and/or a unique (desirable) system.
2) Active: During combat operations SOF employing a unique caliber/cartridge will be followed across the battlefield due to spent casings. Anytime a SOF operator fires a round he will be leaving a tell tale sign. Depending on the scale of the conflict, this could easily result in an increased effort to track and eliminate those elements, something no SOF element needs above and beyond the normal hazards. Another aspect of different ammunition is sound signature, again marking the location of the SOF element in the firefight bringing added attention from the enemy.
B. Interoperability.
1) US Forces: Due to world events and political concerns SOF operates less unilaterally and more with conventional US forces or at a minimum SOF uses conventional US areas to stage from. SOF must be able to share both weapons PLL and ammunition types in order to conduct sustained operations. A SOF specific weapon or ammunition will require SOF specific logistics, which may or may not be able to meet the demands of the force across the world.
2) Allied Forces: There is a reason that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed; to develop a union that could come together and operate as one. A portion of this issue was (and is) the ability to use one another’s stores and be able to share war-fighting supplies (i.e. ammunition). On even a larger scale US SOF conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is which they conduct training with and for allied nations. Since a vast majority of our allies use a M16 variant and an even large number use weapons chambered in 5.56mm, US SOF would have to be issued two separate systems to meet the FID requirements.
C. Availability. In conjunction with interoperability is availability through STRAC. 5.56mm is commonly (and currently) a CALS item, meaning that very little if any is available for training or to units not forward deployed. Adding a specialty caliber will only exacerbate this issue thus further reducing the ability of the operators to train.
5. CONCLUSIONS. Is should be apparent by now that this document is not in favor of adopting the 6.8mm cartridge. It has no “value added” over the existing system, with the exception of lethality (as compared against M855) it provides more problems than it solves. Until the entire US Army and all of NATO adopt this caliber, it is not feasible to suggest that SOF be hindered with a unique unsupportable caliber/ammunition. As initially stated, continued investigation into new systems should continue but not at the expense of existing systems.
6. POC this document; CW3 Michael Haugen, 1st SFG(A),
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Rick - Well maybe not bust your bubble - I am just not the biggest M193 fan -but our M855 (C77) will do MOA or better so I have no issues with its accuracy.
My own expericne has the M855 fragmenting to slightly lower velocites than M193 - due to its longer OAL and dissimilar construction.
Our Doc (who also is accidentally a NAvy LCdr too - but not a reservist

) is trying to set up some Xray stuff with the BMT and coresponding ammuntion.