[Richard]

I cannot predict the outcome of the war in Afghanistan. I am fairly certain, however, that a favorable outcome will not be accomplished without the participation of the tribal groups on both a military front and with a political/social contribution. But for the sake of argument let us assume that none of the impediments heretofore mentioned come to be and that the program succeeds as envisioned to reach Phase V: Sustainability. Will it then suffer the same fate as in Vietnam? The success of Phase V in Afghanistan can be enhanced when tribal cultures are considered in the National Strategy. Of utmost importance is that each tribe must be deployed in the area in which they live. They must be made to retain their culture and identity for as long as it is prudent.

The tribal groups secure their area one at a time; or in concert. As a tribal area is deemed “secure” it maintains this responsibility. Realignment in the make-up of the fighting force occurs so that tribesmen can return to a normal way of life in supporting themselves. This does not mean disarming tribesmen who consider owning a weapon a given right. Forming a ‘Home Force’ (National Guard/police force) is a consideration. Ongoing Civic Action programs must be expanded to include an infrastructure. Tribal leadership is maintained in accordance with their own customs. The tribe must be made to feel that the Afghan government by its actions is their government as well. As tribal villages become secure it expands to Districts, then Provinces and then Regions. These then enjoin with the cities and towns (which were secured by NATO/Afghan military forces) and which are now maintained by local police forces.

It is my judgment that the Afghan tribes are too headstrong to be made into “Gypsies of the Battlefield” as were made the tribes of Vietnam. Or will the Afghan tribes suffer the same fate as the Montagnards in Vietnam because, like the Vietnamese government, the Afghan government feels threatened by armed tribesmen who are by nature better combatants than the Afghan military?


POSTSCRIPT
10 March 2012

It has now been two years to the date that this manuscript was written. One cannot overlook the numerous missteps made by NATO in conducting this war from the outset foremost being the delay in a counterinsurgency strategy; nor can the serious shortcomings of the Afghan Government be ignored as contributing to the growing unrest and increasing outbursts – both from the Afghans and Americans as well - for getting NATO out of Afghanistan as quickly as it can be achieved.

Although many of the original U.S. war goals such as defeating the Taliban, installing democracy and abolishing corruption have largely been abandoned, it is my belief that the Administration’s policies have been based more and more on political decisions these past few years than on outcome considerations just as they were late into the Vietnam War. I can see the pattern developing whereby negotiations will begin with the Taliban, such as they began with Communist North Vietnam, only to have Vietnam ultimately under the control of the North.

In this regard, as in Vietnam, the United States is focused not on the mission, but on how soon it can leave Afghanistan while the Taliban are in no hurry and are willing to wait it out for their advantage. It won’t now be long before we will know the answer to “Is Afghanistan another Vietnam? Will the Taliban once again gain control over Afghanistan? I am not at all comfortable with what that answer will be!