If there is anything new in counterinsurgency warfare it is only in its political application. Tools of the guerrilla have not changed as they remain primarily non-military. That is, they are all calculated to gain control of the people. Voluntary support at first; support through fear and intimidation if necessary. Tools of the counterinsurgency force must be the same. It does not want to nourish the insurgency or escalate it. It must determine what it wants in Afghanistan (mission); what if any limitations to impose; to what extent it is willing to go to reach its goal(s); and to allow the commander on the ground to do the job.
All NATO and Afghan agencies must coordinate and speak off the same sheet of music. The Afghan government must be made to respond positively to the general direction in which NATO thinks it should go. Do not expect them to buy each and every action proposed. Try to make them believe it is their idea. It must be the Afghan government that solves this problem if it is to be a lasting solution. Advantage must be taken of the capabilities of the government forces. The NATO trained regular forces need to operate in the remote areas against strong Taliban resistance. Special Forces trained tribal groups must maintain security and population support in the rural and remote towns and villages. NATO trained police and security forces must maintain law and order in the cities. Unfortunately, to date, most of this training has been slow to reach the desired levels for the Afghans to take responsibility. Therefore the bulk of these responsibilities are being deferred to NATO forces as they were in Vietnam.
Tribal Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has taken on an unconventional approach and that is as it should be. And who better trained than forces such as the “Green Berets”? They are trained to work with an indigenous population; they have the skills necessary to be deployed as an independent unit; they have the training to be innovative, to think on their feet, to improvise, to work as a team under stressful conditions. And if they are properly employed they are a cost effective force multiplier. They must be considered the experts in the field. As such it is imperative that they have complete freedom from planning, organizing and execution of the mission. Very likely employed in remote areas they must have complete decision making authority and report to the single authority that is responsible for covert operations. Simply stated, complete autonomy comes to mind.
They must have full funding, the authority to make timely direct purchases of material and equipment off the local economy; for payment to the locals for support required; and for Civic Action projects. If at all possible they must be able to have access to artillery support; close air support and troop lift capability if a large Taliban force is engaged.
However, it is not prudent for them to go toe to toe with a large force when not necessary.
Building a Tribal Army is usually conducted in phases which can then become milestones as to the progress being made. The phases established by Special Forces detachments in Vietnam were as follows:
- Phase I: Pre-deployment - The Detachment begins its preparation for the mission.
- Phase II: Deployment - The Detachment is transported into the area of operations to begin the preparations for counterinsurgency.
- Phase III: Growth - This will be based upon the progress made and the will of the tribe.
- Phase IV: Expansion – This will be a major decision as it will require the establishment of sub-OBs and the necessary resources to support them.
- Phase V: Sustainability – This program will endure only as long as the Afghan government maintains the trust of the tribe; continues to finance and support the program; incorporates humanitarian projects as promised; and maintains the U.S. Special Forces presence until the time is right to integrate the tribes into the national realm of things.
Phase V is that which is troublesome to me. In Vietnam it was called “Operation Switchback” whereby the Village Defense Program would convert to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. What are some of the pitfalls of this Phase that occurred in Vietnam that I fear may now be trending in Afghanistan? Premature conversion is the most devastating for it leads to all the other problems. At first no one wants to become involved in organizing the tribes for counterinsurgency warfare. The local government has its political reasons; the U.S. leadership has the uncertainty of a covert operation.
In Vietnam the Village Defense Program began as a covert operation under the aegis of the Saigon stationed CIA’s Combined Studies Branch. Within two months the Village Defense Program showed such progress and promise that it was uncovered in a N.Y. Times article under the banner “U.S. Making Army of Vietnam Tribe”. Other than a Vietnamese government directed “down time” the program progressed relentlessly despite the following. The Vietnamese Government insisted that a Public Survey Officer, a civilian member of the Politburo, be assigned to Buon Enao to monitor the program and be responsive to the Provincial Chief.
Every senior U.S. government official from the American Ambassador, the Commander in Chief Vietnam, the Commander in Chief Pacific, U.S. Army Chief of Staff; and throw in the Army Pictorial Service who produced a TV documentary, hastily visited Buon Enao for briefings. The pressure was now on from the Vietnamese Government for the U.S. to pass control of the Buon Enao Project to the Vietnamese Special Forces. While still working Phase III, and several months removed from reaching Phase IV of the plan, the Department of Defense agreed to “Operation Switchback”.
Then, in July 1962, only five months into our deployment, the Department of Defense made the decision to transfer complete responsibility for Special Forces operations to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, thus making the Army responsible for U.S. support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Program. “Switchback” was to be accomplished in Phases to be completed by July 1963.
At the time of my Team’s departure in August 1962 there were 18 U.S. Special Forces A-Detachments deployed in Vietnam. By November, assigned to the recently activated Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam reporting to the Military Assistance Command Vietnam, there was a C-Detachment, three B-Detachments and twenty six A-Detachments who were operating in camps in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones. Needless to say, this expansion was so rapid that much of the criteria established for insuring success with the Rhade tribe was either overlooked or ignored. Instead the emphasis was on speed while the psychological impact went sorely lacking.
In December 1962 the Vietnamese Government declared the entire Rhade Area of Operation of Darlac Province “secure”. This triggered a shift in emphasis from the original sense of the Village Defense Program from an area development/denial project to Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps for offensive strike force operations. The Montagnards were no longer being utilized to secure, defend and support themselves from their own villages. Rather they were being employed in situations favorable to Vietnamese pacification programs. Civic Action programs for the Montagnards came to a halt. Village defenders were being disarmed; and the strike force was placed under the command of the Province Chief. The Montagnard camps were soon situated in remote areas along the western border with the primary mission of border surveillance. And there they remained until the war’s end.
Without getting into details needless to say the Vietnamese were not ready to gain control of this operation. They did not have the training, experience, financing or resources to support the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. The result turned out to be devastating. The entire concept of Tribal Counterinsurgency was turned on its head. The Montagnards became “Gypsies of the Battlefield”. Ever changing missions, misuse by Vietnamese commanders who knew little or nothing of their capabilities and limitations. They were relocated or resettled at the whim of the Vietnamese who did not take into account Montagnard culture. This was a prime factor when in 1963 eighteen Civilian Irregular Defense Group border camps were forced to close before becoming operational; and for the Montagnard uprising (FULRO Movement) that took place in Ban Me Thout (the heart of Rhade country) on 19 September 1964 when “more than 3,000 heavily armed tribesmen … were killing 29 Vietnamese, capturing a hundred more, and seizing twenty American Special Forces advisors as hostages”.
I cannot claim to have first hand information as to what the tribal counterinsurgency program is undergoing in Afghanistan. I can only surmise from written accounts that they may have already or are undergoing some of these same pitfalls. It is well known that in Afghanistan ‘tribal teams’ are being employed with much success and promise. Thus, they are being considered for a greater counterinsurgency role. But what is the trade off? Is the Afghan government associated with the Command and Control; are the Special Forces A-Detachment commanders located with the tribes now tied to a military chain-of-command; will financial and logistical support now be subject to the Afghan budget; will A-Detachments no longer have the autonomy heretofore mentioned as being necessary for the grass roots success? Will the Rules of Engagement be tailored to tribal warfare? These are questions I have no answer for.
(Cont'd)