[Richard]

Covert Operations

In Vietnam the United States military was hesitant on taking on the Buon Enao Tribal Counterinsurgency project as they believed it was improper for them to be conducting covert operations without the knowledge of the Government of Vietnam. The project was defaulted to the CIA for whom clandestine missions was not new. It was also understood that if uncovered the public outcry would create a public relations nightmare.

In Afghanistan under today’s climate it has been politically correct to acknowledge that covert operations are being undertaken with the full knowledge of the Afghan Government; and the U.S. press as well. The only problem is that when each specific covert action is uncovered whether a drone attack, the killing or capture of an insurgent leader or the loss of special operation personnel the Afghan Government is either forced to condemn it or claim no knowledge of it; while the press clamors for details
Political

A sitting Senator, John Kennedy, in 1962 became the newly elected President of the United States and was shortly faced with the decision to expand the counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.

A sitting Senator, Barack Obama, in 2008 became the newly elected President of the United States and was shortly faced with the decision to expand the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.

FOR THE DIFFERENCES

Political structure

At the outset of the insurgency South Vietnam had an elected, functioning government in
place; as well as an Armed Force - weak as it was.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan one government after another was overthrown until 1992 when the Mujahideen assumed control and declared the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Almost immediately thereafter civil war continued among the various clans and religious groups. The only armed forces were the militias.
Economy

Vietnam had a market economy with many resources. Rubber, coffee, rice, lumber, fishing, tourism, agriculture and light industry were major products. They had a transportation system, communications system, education system and health system.

On the other hand Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Sheep and sheep products, fruit, nuts, and precious and semi-precious gems offer a small export market. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. They lack developed natural resources with the exception of the poppy trade for which opium is their largest export.

External support

In Vietnam the Viet Cong received major support from the Chinese and Russians. Financial aid, equipment and material, advisors, training and political backing was unrelenting and instrumental in the advances they made.

The Taliban receives the bulk of their support from Pakistan; and to a lesser extent from Saudi Arabia. This comes in the form of financing, military aid and political backing.

Insurgents

The Viet Cong evolved into a large and well organized, equipped and dedicated external force referred to as the North Vietnamese Army. Capable of massing only to quickly disperse and fade into the jungles they employed mostly guerrilla tactics.

The Taliban, on the other hand, is a relatively small number of determined locals working out of small cells mostly independently. They are tenacious and well trained for what they do. Creating chaos through acts of terrorism is their modus operandi either in the form of threats, suicide bombings or assassinations.

Infrastructure

The infrastructure in Vietnam was modestly advanced so that there was little
discontentment of the living conditions that could easily detract from the counterinsurgency effort. That is, except for the tribal regions where the Viet Cong made their greatest inroads.

In Afghanistan infrastructure is almost non-existent. This makes it difficult to provide even the basic services the population expects to include security. This foments hatred and disrespect for the Kabul government.

Tribal status

In Vietnam over 40 Montagnard tribal groups with close similarities were found mostly in the Central Highlands covering nearly two thirds of the country. Both sides of the insurgency had generally conceded that “he who gained the Central Highlands would win the war”. The tribes themselves, though strategically located, did not possess the political influence or resistance capability to influence the government of South Vietnam.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, is loosely knit ethnic groups who have their own way of living and who are spread throughout the country. These are tribal groups who self govern based on tradition; and who have leverage on political decisions.

Landscape

The tribes of Vietnam occupied a vast territory that was dispersed, with the largest tribes, the Rhade, Jarai, Bahnar and Sedang separated by distinct provinces. These tribes, collectively defined as Montagnards, were mutually supporting of one another.

In Afghanistan overlapping tribal areas create inter-tribal conflict. The Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, is particularly important.

Technology

In Vietnam the insurgency was fought with the technology available of that era. At the outset a rudimentary form of warfare was fought by both sides with the Viet Cong the more austere of the two. As the insurgency expanded modern weapons were introduced.

In Afghanistan the most evident progress has been in the field of electronics. Lap Tops, cell phones, satellite navigation systems, drones and others have provided both the insurgents and counterinsurgents new capabilities.

Public support

In Vietnam counterinsurgency began on a small scale with U.S. involvement primarily that of training and assistance provided by the Military Assistance Advisory Group. As the war escalated and large numbers of American troops were committed to the conflict the anti-war factions began to strengthen; and as American casualties mounted support was at its lowest ebb.
In Afghanistan the conflict began with an invasion of a U.S. led coalition supported in general by the American public. A counterinsurgency plan was not put into effect until years later. To date public support for this all-volunteer military force has remained relatively steady; but as the war drags on and American casualties increase support is faltering.

On the right course

It is my opinion that the best condition for success in Afghanistan lies with the tribal groups. Although special operation forces have been working with the tribes almost from the outset I sense that they are facing some of the same pitfalls that rendered the once highly successful Vietnam tribal program neutralized.

I recently read Major Gant’s “One Tribe at a Time” paper. It was no surprise to me that his approach much mirrored that which I employed in Vietnam in 1962. In each situation there were signs that the tribal groups offered the best hope against the insurgency – for both political and tactical reasons.

Before proceeding let me be clear about one important consideration. Although this war can be classified as a “low intensity conflict” the conditions that existed for conducting Tribal Counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong in Vietnam were not as severe, nor as dangerous nor as complicated as they are today in Afghanistan. Nevertheless Tribal Counterinsurgency has many similarities in Afghanistan today as they were in Vietnam in 1962. There are, therefore, lessons to be learned. Not everything done in Vietnam was done wrong! However, do not confuse the Viet Cong conflict in the early 1960’s with the conventional conflict against the North Vietnamese Army which later followed when the U.S. fully committed.

Not much more need be done than dust off the After Action reports and other studies to find that counterinsurgency succeeds when the right application and type of forces are utilized to fight an insurgent. The enemy needs to be fought as he fights us– tactically and psychologically. Support of the population for security and intelligence is as necessary for the Afghan government as it is for the Taliban.

Although one might compare NATO”s involvement in Afghanistan with the coalition involvement in Vietnam, I cannot fully accept that political comparison. However, it is an insurgent conflict and for that I must conclude that the activity at the grass roots level remains relatively unchanged. The conflict must be kept austere, rudimentary and with the local people and Civic Action foremost in mind. Physical security and personal protection; improved living conditions; and a better way of life – or at the very least the hope for this - is what will win the population over.

In any event, the indigenous forces need to be trained only to the extent necessary to do their job; equipped only to the extent to get the job done; and advised only to the extent of influencing what these needs should be. We do not want to make the mistake of arming them beyond their capability. It is not necessary to train, equip or organize them in the image of the American Army. Rather, we need to capitalize on their natural abilities and inherent capabilities, to build their confidence and strengthen their leadership. Civic Action programs must go hand in hand with military activity.

(Cont'd)