[MtnGoat]

In 2005 to 2006 the British took over the Helmand and brokered a “peace deal” molded after the Northern Ireland. With this combat operation slowed, if not halted. The only U.S. presence was USSF in the Helmand. This “deal” added to the increase drug cultivation of poppy fields in Southern Afghanistan. Poppy field establishment and cultivation doubled if not tripled due to this “deal” in the Helmand. Now Taliban had an internal source of funding their campaigns against the occupying forces in Afghanistan. ISAF, DOS and international community has yet to control this problem.

Now with the LDI/VSP programs being implemented as a program similar to the approach advocated by Major Jim Gant. To use Afghanistan’s various tribes as a proxy for both political legitimacy against the Taliban and a more effective and relevant structure for a local village provision of governance I love the term of “Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense.” Really? But, I thought in 2003/2004 the international community had pushed for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program to pull power from the Warlords and put it back into the newly formed Central Government power.

Doing my VSP, I would see internet articles indicating that the Taliban are supportive and already making the ‘government in a box‘ coming true in Marjah and Kandahar as promised by Gen. McChrystal; but it isn’t materializing. But these VSP and “ink spot” strategy in remote village are indicative of what we can expect in Kubal, Kandahar and elsewhere. What is the best strategy for Afghanistan? What will make this nightmare go away? If anything. Is it a Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense (TC UW/FID) approach executed by leveraging the social tribal system that defines Afghan society? For any SF guy out on the ground, does anyone really ask a person in Afghanistan, “Who are you?” What will they tell you? Most likely they will tell you about their tribe, ethnicity or sect – but not nationality. Most people in Afghanistan don’t know Jack outside of their villages. Even Jinga Truck drivers look at Afghanistan as a line on a map — drawn by the British. This is from someone that went to some kind of schooling too, most don’t know how to read or anything. The only “Afghan” people are in Kabul, because it pays so well to be Afghani. When you start looking at the tribal Areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is no line. That’s why Afghanistan and Pakistan can’t control their own broader. Adds to this nightmare and will inherently allow the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan outside of the Government control and their currently control areas and providences.

The tribal-based approach has recently crashed and burned in eastern and southern Afghanistan, mainly where the Pashtun majority are and Taliban control or drug trade are. Where an effort to capitalize on a given tribe’s willingness to fight the Taliban in exchange for cold hard cash encountered the insurmountable obstacles of inter-tribal rivalries; hostile and threatened Afghan government structures which typically are drug controlled government lands; U.S. civilian unwillingness to risk alienating the Afghan government; and simply insufficient U.S. policy makers knowledge of the complexities of Afghan tribal structures and how to navigate them. I feel a contributing factor of this lack of understanding within the U.S. Military and high-level U.S. decision makers, is how can you teach someone how the cultural changes from the East to the West to the South to the North that come from a Kabul-centric background or political. Hell, all educated and wealthy enough Afghani’s leave Afghanistan, learn English, acquire a security clearance and secure lucrative western government employment do so. But what do they do for their villages, cities? Most Interpreters move from Kabul to work elsewhere. Vast majority of people in Afghanistan do not view the legitimate of any national authority from Kabul-tribal based centric. Further, Afghanistan lacks the infrastructure of commerce, transport and communication that facilitate the development of national identity. What Nation building has happen in Afghanistan? I think also within the military, both SOF and Conventional, we have Officers that have done two or three trips at ground leaders (Officers) and now are at the staff levels and they feel that they know what is going on. At the SOF level you have commanders that say “I know all I need to know about Unconventional Warfare” or the Conventional Officer “ I know how to run an Counterinsurgency Campaign, what else do I need to learn” To both of them, do you really know (or DO) UW or COIN? Maybe you just had a surrogate force (to achieve U.S. objectives??) that you really only lead from compound to compound and did they really go do things for U.S. objectives? This adds to the raise IMO of the Taliban if and when the U.S. and ISAF pulls out.

To this end, people throughout Afghanistan do not view Hamid Karzai as a legitimate leader, mainly it is only the Phastun’s. This sentiment has hardened in the aftermath of the massive fraud uncovered in connection with the recent election (2004, 2005 and 2009) with literate Afghans and international with the links between Karzai and his brother and the drug trade and the Taliban along with the Karzai’s Government corruption.

I feel that three things need to happen to help ease these anxiety, fear or terrors that have been leading to these nightmares. It is vital for policy makers to understand—some of the very tribal leaders we seek to influence in our efforts against the Taliban are actually threatened by our support of Karzai’s Government. Regardless of our intent or mission, they perceive our actions as empowering his (Karzai) tribe (Pashtun) and their tribal allies to dominate the other tribes via the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP) once the coalition eventually withdrawals its forces. Which both are broken due to ISAF leading them by the hand on every mission. Second policy makers and military alike need to lay out a policy of what needs to be done with the Central Asia States and to disseminate this plan out to the lower levels. Lastly we need to use a Rumsfeld's quote “put Boots on the ground” in Pakistan tribal belt (NWFP and FATA). Why have we not done this, IMHO it is because of the balancing act the U.S and UK must do between Pakistan and India. We have not gone into NWFP and FATA to attack the known Taliban and Al Qeada locations and Madrassas are; we could drop a shit tin of hell overnight if we wanted too. But we can’t IMO, Why? This would add to another nightmare; Rekindling effects over the 2002 nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan. We don’t go into Pakistan because we need the land routes from the Karachi ports to Afghanistan Bases. India has ports, but their land routes into Afghanistan really didn’t get fully established until 2005. But in 2008 Pakistan said not to India and not allowing India any land route from within Pakistan to trade with Afghanistan and no accord will be signed to the detriment of national (Pakistan) interest. So for us to change direction and start using land routes in India and to start combat operations inside Pakistan.. well, do I need to go down that road? Nightmare!!

So if the U.S. Pulls out of Afghanistan will the Taliban and Al Qeada come back and control Afghanistan? YES they will. Not only Afghanistan but Pakistan, and other Central Asia States - AQ is there now is some form. Taliban will rise faster, but Al Qeada will sit back and feed Taliban for many years before stepping in full. Al Qeada has base of operations elsewhere. Not to mention Iran influence (Qods) inside Afghanistan and the region.