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NDD- My interpretation of the matter is that he did not call for total war, but for war with sufficient force to overwhelm the enemy (I think it's the fourth or fifth section of chapter one). There, I think, the Powell Doctrine and Clausewitz have similar views. Also, they both view war as a secondary political option, a continuation of policy by other means (although that is a misquote if properly translated).
One of my major questions regarding OIF is if the CINC attempted to limit the number of coalition assets deployed, or if they tried to maximise the number (use ever capable soldier, for example). I read in many analyses that the coalition employed too few assets, but never that limiting the number of soldiers deployed was an objective.
Adam- I think that the Powell doctrine as defined above is vague enough in its criteria to be used as a justification for war, or as a crutch. Terrorism, for example, could be seen as a direct threat to national security, or, as during the Clinton years, not.
Interestingly, there seems to be some circularity in this conversation. The concept of maximum use of force to win dictated by Clausewitz is often portrayed as one of the central reasons for the pointless slaughter of WW1- military machine societies building up armies in anticipation of war. The carnage of WW1 may have influenced the British and certainly influenced the French in their choice of a strategy of appeasement in WW2, which could be seen as an implementation of a prototypical Powell Doctrine. In this case, Clausewitzian and [umm] Powellian theories are apparently diametrically opposed.
I'm interested in determining the compatability of 'the Powell Doctrine', or, if it is, Clausewitzian strategy in general, and attempts to combat insurgency and nation build. I'd like to use OIF as an example, but first I need to determine the extent to which the Powell Doctrine and/or Clausewitzian strategies were employed.
Solid
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