[The Reaper]

Continued...

In a third activity in September 2007, the ODA arranged a “Sons of Iraq,” or SOI, contract between the sahawa and the 5-82 Field Artillery Battalion to assist the ISF in securing the IED-laden roads of the northern Zaab Triangle. This SOI contract proved so successful that the 5-82 FA expanded the concept to other groups across its sector of the southern Ninewah Province.

In October, the ODA encouraged the 1-87 Infantry Battalion, in Hawijah, to work closely with the Zaab ISF and to initiate a SOI program for the sahawa in order to secure the roads of the central Zaab Triangle. From the beginning, the ODA influenced the Kirkuk provincial government to co-sign the SOI contract to ensure the sahawa’s loyalty to the GOI. Seeing the value of the SOI program, the 1-87 commander employed it across his entire battalion battlespace. The effect was rapid and remarkable. Camp McHenry, the 1-87 headquarters in Hawijah, had received daily indirect fire for the previous year; but by November 2007, the attacks had ceased.5

The 1-10 Infantry BCT followed suit and employed the SOI program across its entire sector. The new alliance was the single largest volunteer mobilization since the war began.6 The expansion of SF’s influence and the long-term shaping of the operational environment was made possible by the foundation of FID training. The ODA’s ability to neutralize a previous AQI stronghold and promote the primacy of the ISF was no aberration.

Detachments from the 10th SF Group accomplished similar results across all of northern Iraq during OIF V.

ODA 0324 had a similar experience in gaining influence through FID during OIF VI in the holy city of Najaf, the capital of the Shia world. The previous ODA in Najaf focused on conducting leader engagements and collecting atmospherics and had conducted only four SF-advised ISF operations during the previous year. The provincial governor and the provincial director of police had a standing agreement with JAM in Najaf that JAM would not be targeted if it refrained from conducting attacks there. Therefore, JAM and JAM Special Groups, or JAM-SG,7 had freedom of movement in Najaf while they facilitated and planned attacks in other provinces. So while JAM-SG conducted attacks against CF convoys in adjacent provinces, in Najaf, the ISF elements, the police and the IA’s 30th Brigade, 8th Division, were stagnant. On the surface, Najaf appeared calm; in reality, it resembled a turbulent JAM-SG beehive.

Soon after its arrival in May 2008, ODA 0324 implemented an intensive FID training program with the burgeoning An Najaf SWAT, or ANSWAT, and special-forces platoons within the 30th IA BDE. The ODA revamped the ANSWAT qualification course program of instruction, or POI, into a five-week course that began with a challenging selection phase, followed by an operator training phase. The ODA helped the ANSWAT commander select NCOs to run future qualification courses and sustainment training for the unit. The ODA taught the ANSWAT NCOs how to lead training and then supervised them as they trained the unit. By September 2008, Najaf had a 110-man SWAT company that was fit, motivated, tactically sound and sustainable. >Top <blockedhttp://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Page1_Cont.htm>

Brigadier General Majid, commander of the 30th IA, witnessed the development of the ANSWAT and grew receptive to the ODA’s suggestions. He accepted the ODA’s recommendation to unite the three special-forces platoons in his brigade into one unit, the 30th IA Brigade Special Forces Company. The ODA conducted an assessment of the IA special-forces soldiers and developed a training POI. The soldiers had been trained by SF in the past, and the ODA determined that they needed to refresh their skills in combat marksmanship and small-unit tactics, or SUT. Once that was complete, the ODA leveraged its new influence with Majid to supply the special-forces company with flashlights for their weapons and trained them extensively on nighttime marksmanship and SUT. Those night skills proved critical during subsequent operations.

The training and skills-development of both Iraqi units led to a healthy competition to be the best in Najaf. Each unit wanted more training and combat-advising from the ODA to improve their skills and reputation, which expanded the ODA’s influence significantly. Soon the commander of the Najaf police’s Thu Al Fuqar Battalion approached the ODA to request training for his “special platoon.” This was significant because he, the provincial director of police and the lieutenant governor had served in Badr Corps8 together for decades and now formed the true power trio in Najaf.

Although the governor held the governorship,9 those three actually possessed more power in the province because of their standing within Badr Corps and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.10 In recent years, the secretive Thu Al Fuqar had gained a reputation as a rogue but effective unit that operated on behalf of the Badr Corps. The ODA capitalized on the opportunity to gain better access and influence with these actual leaders of Najaf, trained the police battalion’s special platoon, and later combat-advised its operations to effectively neutralize a JAM-SG IED cell in northern Najaf.

The FID program expanded the ODA’s influence in intelligence-collection, as well. Cooperation with the ISF units’ intelligence sections helped the ODA develop more reliable targets. The expansion of the ODA’s influence with provincial leaders also led to relationships whereby key governmental leaders often shared valuable intelligence with the ODA. Ultimately, the FID program enabled the ODA to develop dependable intelligence and served to influence the provincial governor and ISF leaders to begin approving SF-advised direct-action operations to arrest mid- and high-level members of JAM-SG seeking refuge in Najaf.

The Hay al-Rathma neighborhood, in the Sadr City of Najaf, was long considered a JAM-SG controlled area, off-limits to ISF and CF. On Oct. 23, 2008, the ODA gained intelligence and approval to conduct a series of raids against three targets in Hay al-Rahtma. The ODA combat-advised the 30th IA Brigade SF Company in the successful arrest of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s number-three HVT, Ali Hamza Hadad; the ODA’s HVT, Sayid Jihad Musawi; and the Multi-National Division-Central’s HVT, Nasir the Fat. Those raids ended Hay al-Rahtma’s status as a JAM-SG safe zone.

From October 2008 to January 2009, ODA 0324 continued to combat-advise the ANSWAT, the 30th IA Brigade SF Company and Thu Al Fuqar during 23 raids across the An Najaf Province with 21 of them (91 percent) resulting in the arrest of the primary target. In all, 38 warranted JAM-SG insurgents were put behind bars. These terrorists included an unprecedented nine HVTs of the MNC-I, MND-C and Task Force-17. Intelligence feedback indicated that not only was Najaf no longer a safe haven for JAM-SG but also that terrorists who once found sanctuary in Najaf were fleeing the province to seek refuge elsewhere.

The ODA’s FID program not only led to degradation of JAM-SG but also enabled the ODA to expand its influence into the rural tribal areas of the province. The commander of the 5th Department of Border Enforcement, or DBE, approached the ODA to request training for his Cobra Force. The ODA provided some training and developed a relationship that would facilitate intelligence-gathering and access to area sheiks.

The sheiks were totally disenchanted with the GOI, especially the Badr-led provincial government and police. In November 2008, the ODA learned that several sheiks were so angry with the provincial government that they were making plans to conduct a provincial coup with 300,000 armed tribesmen. Through FID training and integrating Civil Affairs projects funded by Najaf’s provincial reconstruction teams, the ODA was able to gain great influence over the 5th DBE and the tribes and eventually convinced the sheiks to conduct a “democratic revolution” instead of an armed one.

For the first time, these tribes began to acknowledge the new GOI and became involved in the democratic process. The sheiks began organizing conventions and political rallies. During the 2009 provincial election, they won six seats in the Najaf provincial parliament and helped elect the new Najaf governor, Adnan Zurfi, of the Beni Hassan tribe.11

ODA 0324’s ability to build confident and competent ISF, to persuade previously distrustful Shia and Sunni tribes to support the GOI, and to influence provincial and ISF leaders to support effective direct-action operations that ended AQI and JAM-SG sanctuaries was all made possible by the ODA’s robust FID programs.

(Cont.)