[Richard]

Robert S. Mueller, III
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

September 30, 2009
Part 1 of 2

Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the terrorist threats facing our nation and the efforts of the FBI to protect the United States from future terrorist attacks.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI’s priorities shifted dramatically as we charted a new course, with national security at the forefront of our mission. The eight years since have seen significant changes at the FBI, and we have made progress. Today, the FBI is a stronger organization, combining greater capabilities with a longstanding commitment to the security of the United States, while at the same time upholding the Constitution and protecting civil liberties.

The nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States has also changed over these last eight years. A significant evolution in the problem of terrorism is the threat posed by those who believe in al Qaeda’s ideology, since it was in part created 20 years ago to spread a revolutionary idea. Today, while we still face threats from al Qaeda, and many of its affiliated groups, we also face a challenge in dealing with homegrown extremists in the United States who while not formally part of these terrorist organizations, believe in their ideologies and wish to harm the United States in furtherance of it. This requires us to develop an understanding of a diffuse and evolving threat environment and to leverage our unique authorities as both a national security service and a law enforcement organization.

Al Qaeda

Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, we have frequently received credible reports that al Qaeda remains committed to attacking the United States and U.S. interests abroad. Al Qaeda’s primary threat continues to come from the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, but we are seeing persistent activity elsewhere, from Europe to the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Of particular concern to the FBI are individuals who can travel with fewer restrictions to these areas of extremist activity and then enter the United States under less scrutiny.

Fortunately, the success of US military and intelligence operations combined with the work of our allies around the world has diminished al Qaeda’s core external operational capabilities. The elimination of key al Qaeda figures, decline in its capacity to train recruits safely, disruptions in travel routes, reduction of terrorist financing, and the dwindling of safe havens have all reduced the ability of al Qaeda to attack the homeland. The FBI continues to monitor, collect intelligence, and investigate al Qaeda’s reach into the United States.

Affiliated Groups

Some affiliated groups that traditionally had only local agendas have formally joined ranks with al Qaeda and expanded their operational focus regionally, or even globally, which may include attacks inside the United States. Strong networks have formed that encompass the shifting desire of followers to engage more directly with al- Qaeda and al Qaeda’s vision of violent jihad.

Some of these militant groups have physically re-located closer to core al Qaeda in Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with a refocused attack strategy against coalition troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan and against western interests in the region. Factions of militant groups have executed spectacular attacks within the borders of India to inflame tensions between Pakistan and India. Components more closely aligned with al Qaeda demonstrated their intent and capability to attack western interests through the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and the September 2008 Marriott Hotel truck bombing in Islamabad. Other groups have formed in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, while affiliates in Somalia, Central Asia, and Iraq are also of concern for their potential to broaden their targeting focus.

The increased role of militant factions in al Qaeda operational activities poses the FBI with two problems. First, al Qaeda has a new pipeline of individuals to continue filling its ranks with recruits who may develop into operational leaders to conduct future attacks against the homeland and western interests abroad. Second, the involvement of these militant groups presents us with greater difficulties in identifying the enemy. Motivated U.S. persons who reach militant training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones have a potential doorway to involvement in core al Qaeda operational activities.

Homegrown Radicalization

Since 2001, the emergence of individuals and groups inspired by al Qaeda rhetoric but sometimes lacking the capabilities to launch a spectacular, large-scale attack poses a growing homeland challenge. The threat from homegrown violent extremists remains a top terrorism concern for the FBI, but quantifying the threat and assessing the capabilities of these individuals is difficult. While the intent and capability of homegrown extremists varies widely, several FBI terrorism subjects, with no known nexus to overseas extremist networks or groups, have taken steps to move from violent rhetoric to action.

I do not remember a time when these types of loose networks were not a part of my morning briefing. In May 2009, U.S. citizen James Cromitie and three other individuals were arrested for plotting to detonate explosives near a Jewish community center and synagogue. As alleged in the indictment/complaint, they also planned to attack military planes at the New York Air National Guard Base with an anti-aircraft missile system. Cromitie had reportedly been upset about the war in Afghanistan and had expressed interest in doing “something to America.” In December 2008, five individuals, inspired by al Qaeda, were convicted on conspiracy and weapons charges for plotting to conduct a small arms attack against soldiers stationed at the Fort Dix Army Base in New Jersey. Members of the group conducted surveillance, obtained a map of the base, participated in firearms training, and acquired weapons in preparation for the attack.

Trends in Radicalization

Overseas Travel

The role of returning foreign fighters to the United States changes the nature of the threat to the homeland. Individuals inside the United States with foreign fighter experience and a network of extremist contacts overseas can encounter and encourage other like-minded individuals with a strong desire to engage in violence but lack the skills and resources to do so. We have learned that it can take years before individuals with foreign fighter experience begin to develop a radicalization network.

In July 2009, the FBI disrupted a conspiracy by a U.S. citizen and others in the Raleigh, North Carolina-area to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to participate in extremist activities. As articulated in the indictment, Daniel Boyd received military-style training in terrorist camps during the 1989 through 1992 timeframe for the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in Afghanistan and then returned to the United States. Part of the conspiracy involved radicalizing mostly young Muslims or converts to Islam to believe in the idea that violent jihad was a personal obligation on the part of every good Muslim. The conspiracy also consisted of training in weapons, financing, and assistance in arranging overseas travel and contacts so that others could participate in violence.

We know individuals have been recruited to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab. While there are no current indicators that any of the individuals who went to Somalia have been selected, trained, or tasked by al-Shabaab or other extremists to conduct attacks inside the United States, the FBI remains concerned about this possibility.

Individuals who attend overseas madrassas or religious institutions located in terrorist safe havens, such as in the northern regions of Yemen and Pakistan, are at risk of being radicalized or recruited by terrorist organizations. The growing number of individuals in the United States with connections to these types of institutions also provides an indirect means for those inspired by extremist rhetoric—but who lack the necessary contacts to increase their participation in violent actions—to become more engaged.

Role of the Internet and Social Networking

The Internet also remains a powerful conduit for radicalization efforts. Al Qaeda effectively uses the Internet to spread its message through statements for consumption by anyone with access to an Internet connection. The ability to exert global influence through cyberspace further contributes to the amorphous nature of the threat facing the homeland by affording individuals access and anonymity within a self-reinforcing extremist environment. Individuals can also find like-minded extremists using chat rooms and social networking sites, enhancing their ability to develop global networks of extremist contacts.

In August 2009, an Atlanta jury heard about a cluster of extremists who had formed a loose on-line network connecting individuals in North America, Europe, and South Asia. U.S. citizen Ehsanual Sadequee was found guilty of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists after he and another American, Syed Ahmed, made contact in chat rooms with like-minded individuals and proceeded to plan attacks, conduct surveillance of potential target sites within the United States, and pursue overseas training.

(cont'd)