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**Airbornelawyer** · 05-27-2004, 11:29

As I noted, when the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was at its best in strength and training, it might have been comparable to a Ranger battalion.

There were differences, though. First, while AIC was, at least early on, comparable to RIP, there was no other formal screening requirement. There was informal hazing, though, that many a battboy would recognize (the videos that leaked of that hazing were probably as responsible for disbandment as anything that went on in Somalia). Also, CF has no equivalent to Ranger School for junior infantry leaders (though quite a few went to US Army Ranger School or similar courses). On the other hand, unlike most RIPpies, new members of the CAR were more experienced soldiers, having served an average of 18 months in one of the feeder regiments (mainly RCR, R22eR and PPCLI).

Regarding leaders, when the CAR was downsized in 1991-92, commanders of the commandos went from being senior majors with previous infantry company command to junior majors on their first command. Company commanders in Ranger battalions are as a rule branch-qualified captains on their second command. For example, one of my OCS and IOBC buddies commanded a company in the 82nd before taking over a company in 3rd Ranger Battalion.

Since members of the CAR remained affiliated with their parent regiments, selection of NCOs and officers for assignment involved the regimental career managers of the RCR, R22eR and PPCLI. AFIK, the CAR generally didn't have a problem with the parent regiments "encouraging" volunteers to get rid of them, but this has happened often enough in SOF units to be a cliche. As the Somalia Inquiry Report notes, the "CAR commander always had the authority to return members to their original units if they did not measure up, but this was not done often. Essentially, the CAR had to trust the parent regiments to send the right people." The report does cite quite a few problems in the early 1990s with the quality of officers and soldiers being sent by the parent regiments.

Looking forward then, it would seem that even if the individual airborne companies in the three regiments routinely trained together, this informal airborne battalion would have problems. As part of JTF-2's expansion, it was planned to increase the parent battalions's special operations capabilities so they could be better feeder units for JTF-2, but this has apparently been scrapped as unaffordable.

The essential problem is one that Lewis MacKenzie has spoken about for several years. Canada has made a political decision to not really have a warfighting army. The army as a whole is consequently too small and too committed to peacekeeping operations to sustain a larger special operations capability and provide the pool of qualified volunteers to keep these units manned. The active battalions can't maintain their own strength, much less feed personnel to a larger JTF-2 or a reconstituted airborne battalion. And given Canada's foreign policy, even if a new high-speed SOF battalion were formed, it would likely be deployed more often for non-SOF missions, dulling its edge.

05-27-2004, 11:29	#6
Airbornelawyer Moderator Join Date: Jan 2004 Posts: 1,953	As I noted, when the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was at its best in strength and training, it might have been comparable to a Ranger battalion. There were differences, though. First, while AIC was, at least early on, comparable to RIP, there was no other formal screening requirement. There was informal hazing, though, that many a battboy would recognize (the videos that leaked of that hazing were probably as responsible for disbandment as anything that went on in Somalia). Also, CF has no equivalent to Ranger School for junior infantry leaders (though quite a few went to US Army Ranger School or similar courses). On the other hand, unlike most RIPpies, new members of the CAR were more experienced soldiers, having served an average of 18 months in one of the feeder regiments (mainly RCR, R22eR and PPCLI). Regarding leaders, when the CAR was downsized in 1991-92, commanders of the commandos went from being senior majors with previous infantry company command to junior majors on their first command. Company commanders in Ranger battalions are as a rule branch-qualified captains on their second command. For example, one of my OCS and IOBC buddies commanded a company in the 82nd before taking over a company in 3rd Ranger Battalion. Since members of the CAR remained affiliated with their parent regiments, selection of NCOs and officers for assignment involved the regimental career managers of the RCR, R22eR and PPCLI. AFIK, the CAR generally didn't have a problem with the parent regiments "encouraging" volunteers to get rid of them, but this has happened often enough in SOF units to be a cliche. As the Somalia Inquiry Report notes, the "CAR commander always had the authority to return members to their original units if they did not measure up, but this was not done often. Essentially, the CAR had to trust the parent regiments to send the right people." The report does cite quite a few problems in the early 1990s with the quality of officers and soldiers being sent by the parent regiments. Looking forward then, it would seem that even if the individual airborne companies in the three regiments routinely trained together, this informal airborne battalion would have problems. As part of JTF-2's expansion, it was planned to increase the parent battalions's special operations capabilities so they could be better feeder units for JTF-2, but this has apparently been scrapped as unaffordable. The essential problem is one that Lewis MacKenzie has spoken about for several years. Canada has made a political decision to not really have a warfighting army. The army as a whole is consequently too small and too committed to peacekeeping operations to sustain a larger special operations capability and provide the pool of qualified volunteers to keep these units manned. The active battalions can't maintain their own strength, much less feed personnel to a larger JTF-2 or a reconstituted airborne battalion. And given Canada's foreign policy, even if a new high-speed SOF battalion were formed, it would likely be deployed more often for non-SOF missions, dulling its edge.
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