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Originally Posted by Jack Moroney
I did not suggest that the politicians had no impact on morale, as a matter of fact I did not mention morale at all. My point dealt only with motivation and the fact that motivation comes from within a person and is driven to satisfy a personal need.
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It seems we were working with different definitions of motivation. Organizational Studies literature doesn't distinguish between the internal force/effort to act and morale, which while different, is related to motivation. I used the word motivation to describe both processes. After reviewing your comments, it appears we more or less agree after translating the definition of motivation.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Jack Moroney
Do not try and equate the lessons taught in business schools on leadership and productivity to the military-they are for the most part totally unrelated. Productivity in the business world deals with the bottom line which is measured by cost effectiveness and producing a profit or breaking even for non-profits. We measure our costs in blood spilled and clotted. Leadership in business is often confused with management where resources, including people, are manipulated to achieve the goals of profit production.
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Initial thought: Is there a specific reason that blood spilled may not be considered a cost to creation of inputs, and the result of the battle/mission be considered the revenue? I surmise you may argue it’s because measurements of costs and benefits are very difficult, but were you not faced with decisions where you could expect if missions were attempted that lives would be lost, and still decided to move forward with the mission? It would seem to me that simply because you are making a decision with the costs being lives instead of money isn’t reason enough to dismiss attempting to apply business concepts to the military.
Tangential thoughts: I think I understand your resistance to productivity measurements at what seems to be a more micro level analysis and the problems associated with valuation of the inputs and outcomes, but I do believe the use of productivity measurements in “the military” may be more macro than you stated.
Like many other public organizations, the military produces a public good that is both non-excludable (all citizens in the US receive national defense) and non-rival (one citizen's consumption of national defense does not reduce the amount of national defense for others). The production of this public good, and the different factors that affect it (including politics), is what we are discussing. This method of thinking, of taking private sector ideas and translating them for the public sector to create an applicable model which includes a focus on productivity, were constructed by Mark Moore at the Kennedy school and have since been, more or less, accepted by Public Policy academia. (For more information on Public Goods, see Moore's book
http://www.amazon.com/Creating-Publi...4337347&sr=1-2)
While I do accept that applying a Profit = Total Revenue - Total Cost does not work, as valuing revenue and costs in the military becomes quite difficult, the military does utilize a modified model of Cost-Benefit Analysis. I'm sure you know this far better than me (I believe many of these changes were being implemented during your service in the military), but the Pentagon in the early 1960s implemented the Planning Programming Budget System (PPBS). (see McCaffery and Jones of the Naval Postgraduate school for more information) Essentially, PPBS was designed to measure how a budgetary input decisions impact production (output), and the results (outcomes). My impressions from readings on this topic is that while the budget didn’t value American lives lost, it attempted to value weapons, which to some degree involved valuing the effectiveness of a weapon, and therefore its ability/extent to injure or kill the enemy. I believe the valuation of these inputs is also considered with respect to redundancy, through the use of the JSOP and QDR, among others (correct me if wrong).
It would seem to me that you may counter by describing this macro-system is simply part of the management process, and that once the results of these processes and interactions reach Special Forces, leadership becomes more important to successfully complete missions (outputs) and their resulting impacts (outcomes). I’m still left a little confused by the distinction of management and leadership, especially after you mentioned that management included the manipulation of people (I would have considered that leadership, as it strikes me as a soft skill). I’d be interested in learning if you believe your commentary applies unconditionally in the military, or if it was intended for certain perspectives or situations in the military. And after considering all this, there is the consideration from the start - how does the president affect this production of national defense?
I can only translate your messages based on my experience (essentially none – I’m 23) and education. I am, however, trying my best to keep up with you and actually understand it, so I can recall and use it if I am fortunate enough to make it through OCS and become an MI officer in the army.
Stu