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As I noted in regard to the upcoming anniversary, events in Fallujah should not be viewed in a vacuum. One reason for not going in until all the pieces are in place is to not have a repeat of April 2003, when a small number of paratroopers found themselves facing a large mob, and had neither the preparation or the resources to separate the agitators from the crowd.
Another thing to keep in mind when planning how to deal with the city: while our overall strategy for Iraq has been to try to make the various factions in the country - Sunni and Shi'ite Arab, Kurd, Turkmen, etc. - act like happy campers to each other, in this region we should be developing the intel and resources to play the Sunni tribes against each other. Saddam and the Ba'ath favored the Sunnis over other Iraqis, but within Sunni-land, they favored certain tribes, such as Saddam's own Tikritis, over others. There are bound to be plenty of Sunni Arabs looking for a little payback too.
The Rawi clan, for example, may have been Ba'athists and dislike Americans (Gen. Sayfuddin Fulayyih Hassan Taha ar-Rawi was the Jack of Clubs), but they hate the Tikritis. Within the Tikritis also were clans out of Saddam's favor at various times who may have scores to settle. In both the short and the long run, these rivalries may be worth taking advantage of (they also played a role in Saddam's betrayal and capture).
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