Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
 

This one is likely to shake some branches - the fallout should be interesting.

Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
LTG Daniel Bolger

Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost — but we didn’t have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy.

http://www.amazon.com/Why-We-Lost-Ge...ghanistan+Wars

Richard

Interesting choice for a release date... 11 Nov (Veteran's Day, and after mid-term elections).

Bolger's the man!! I worked for him when he was COS at 2ID. He is a good man - Honorable.

Shack.

From the perspective of a minimally trained Air Advisor to the IqAF, we would have made better progress if more of the team had an SF mindset. As it was, the size of the mission greatly exceeded AFSOC's personnel numbers so it was handed to the conventional side; half of our team were non-vols, and of the half that volunteered maybe a quarter "got it." This made functioning in the gray zone very difficult and slow.

Please note this isn't an indictment against anyone serving as an Air Advisor on a MiTT or the CAFTT as training consisted of a couple months a Camp Bullis, far short of anything resembling an SF pipeline, and was inadequate to give any semblance of language proficiency. Nearly everyone gave it their best shot, but those best efforts were based on the experiences and training each person brought with them and varied widely.

Brush Okie, could you expound on this, I'd be interested in understanding more. Not saying you're wrong at all, just interested in how an SOF unit may imploy tactics that a regular line unit might not think of.

S

Good stuff but its frustrating that so many senior leaders dont seem to be able to articulate this type of shit until AFTER they retire.

Where are all the guys that are able to find solutions for strategic problems while they are still on active duty? If they are out there NOW why do they always wait until after retirement to say something?

That is the thought I had. I don't get it.