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UW Casebook Resource

I cannot access thru my work filter but the following comes to me this morning; will check it out from home. I did verify the links are present at SWJ. Link to both Volumes can be found at:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cas...ionary-warfare

Here is an EXSUM from the Intro/Forward:

Quote:

This project has been the vision of Paul Tompkins who is a
retired Special Forces Warrant Officer who works in the USASOC G3 and
has had the support of the senior Army SOF leadership (see forwards
from LTG Mulholland and (then BG) MG Sacolick below).

This is the first product of others that will be published on Human
Factors In Revolutions and Insurgencies as well as Undergrounds and
Auxiliaries. This anecdote is what it is like to be on a traditional
Special Forces A Team. We owe Paul Tompkins a huge thank you for his
vision and drive to accomplish this project.

"In a rare spare moment during a training exercise, the
Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) Team Sergeant took an old book down
from the shelf and tossed it into the young Green Beret’s lap.
“Read and learn.” The book on human factors considerations in
insurgencies was already more than twenty years old and very out of
vogue. But the younger sergeant soon became engrossed and took other
forgotten revolution-related texts off the shelf, including the 1962
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, which described the
organization of undergrounds and the motivations and behaviors of
revolutionaries. He became a student of the history of unconventional
warfare and soon championed its revival as a teaching subject for the
US Army Special Forces. When his country faced pop-up resistance in
Iraq and tenacious guerrilla bands in Afghanistan during the
mid-2000s, his vision of modernizing the research and reintroducing it
into standard education and training took hold.

This second volume owes its creation to the vision of that young
Green Beret, Paul Tompkins, and to the challenge that his sergeant, Ed
Brody, threw into his lap."

FOREWORD
Unconventional Warfare is the core mission and organizing
principle for US Army Special Forces. The Army is the only military
organization specifically trained and organized to wage Unconventional
Warfare. From their inception, Special Forces and Army Special
Operations Forces were largely focused on developing regional,
cultural, and language skills in recognition of the singular
importance of the human dimensions of war among the people. We have
consistently recognized the importance of dedicating intellectual
efforts to better understand the nature of our environment, the
motivations and behavior of our enemies.

Investment in our human capital is an essential part of developing and
maintaining sufficient capability to conduct Unconventional Warfare or
Unconventional Warfare-related operations in sensitive environments or
conditions.

In the 1960s, our predecessors had the Special Operations
Research Office (SORO) at American University produce a collection of
case studies on insurgent movements; these studies characterized the
motivations and behaviors of revolutionaries and insurgents.
The book provided rich reading and study for generations of scholars,
Green Berets, and other practitioners and is still a relevant part of
our professional literature today. That investment informed our
tactics and operations and set the tone for how US Army Special
Operations practiced irregular warfare.

Today we again find ourselves facing a dynamic, agile, and
flexible enemy whose motivations and behaviors have changed since our
historic studies. Our challenge is to understand today’s very capable,
intelligent, and adaptable enemy and to understand that enemy’s
relationship to relevant populations. We partnered with Johns Hopkins
scholars to build on the foundations of our historic case studies to
produce a new case-study series to help us better understand the
characteristics of the modern operational environment.

I strongly encourage the men and women of Army Special
Operations, the joint Special Operations community, and anyone whose
professional interest encompasses unconventional warfare and irregular
warfare to make these studies a fundamental part of their professional
reading and development. The understanding and successful practice of
Unconventional Warfare and Irregular Warfare demands our best
intellectual appreciation and application as much as it does
excellence within our tactical skill sets.

Strength and Honor,
Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland US Army, Commanding General

Hope this is helpful. The Tbl of Contents is a pretty interesting menu.

Thank you for posting Badger52.

This looks like a good read.

When I was in 10th I had a Tm SGT that did just that. We had 3 out of 5 of those old 1960's booklets from American University. I had to read then asking with our 18F given news guys a book on understand human body & body language. All great reads.

I had a TM SGT that came from the dark side and wanted to get keyed up on UW.. I suggested two of the Bookets. Uf you can get your hands on then do read them. I said wet USASFC needs to uodate then with USASOC historians based off 70's to current UW style OPS.

Quote:

Originally Posted by MtnGoat (Post 458083)

Great stuff. Looks like "from your brain to their Volume II."
:lifter

(and if one doesn't have Vol. I that you mention they should snag that at the same time as the current effort.)

HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES Volume 1
DA Pam 550-104 dtd 1966

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docreposito...surgencies.pdf

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. Volume 2
DA PAM 500-105
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDo

Thank you MtnGoat - A quick skim of Vol 1, Chapter 12, was interesting given the recent events in Libya and Egypt - among many other locations.

HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES

CHAPTER 12
SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION OF CROWDS
Chapter 12 begins approximately on page 198/302

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/docreposito...surgencies.pdf

Latest version is now available:

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Thanks Guys..

While following the links, I found this one.

Quote:

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Insurgency in the Hood: Understanding Insurgencies Through Urban Gangs

2a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Past, current and future military endeavors will invariably involve conflict at the sub-state level. A recurring problem in the study of insurgent conflict is a lack of data that has the readth, depth, and historical accuracy to provide insight as to why, at the individual level, people participate in insurgency. Accessibility to street gangs provides a comprehensive source of data not seen in insurgencies. Street gangs provide a “ground truth”, to the interaction between the state and organized sub-state group in a competition for control. The individuals who fuel both sides of this competition for control are basing decisions to participate in insurgency on a framework founded in rational actor theory, but modified by their perspective of the world. Groups who wish to recruit individuals into their insurgency apply incentives and disincentives selectively to individuals to compel membership. As a group gains more members it can apply more incentives, increasing the rate or future recruitment and level of control over a community. A comprehensive and effective strategy cannot be developed to counter these insurgent forces without answering the fundamental questions behind individual participation first. This thesis examines insurgency from the individual level and proposes concepts that must accompany any attempt to combat rebel groups.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a451328.pdf

While this may be applied to areas like LA and Chicago, the small village politics and micro-geographic fiefdoms in the sandbox have similar small scale dynamics..

Might also be worth a read following the Zimmerman case..

:munchin

I think MS13 already runs El Salvador...

A snippet below from the NPS thesis that JJ posted above - appears that a reasonable reading might apply to Radical Islamists and the world in which they operate, as well.

INSURGENCY IN THE HOOD: UNDERSTANDING
INSURGENCIES THROUGH URBAN GANGS

"Passive support is common in any community. Individuals do not see an associated evil with inaction. In contrast to this sentiment that there is no evil in inaction, the street gang and the insurgency both rely upon passivity to maximize their benefits. Passivity is a form of endorsement. Communities do not see their inactivity as contributing to the problem, but to the insurgency and gang passivity is a tool. The gang or insurgency must secure community passivity to ensure authorities cannot collect intelligence on the illegal activities of the group."

The problem with the citizens remaining passive is the street gang or the insurgency will not let them remain uninvolved. The Viet Cong conscripted villagers to fight or become food/ammo bearers on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If the villagers did not cooperate with the VC, they and usually their families were killed in a brutal manner. This Viet Cong policy led to the formation of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group or CIDG in rural areas of Vietnam, allowing the villagers to be trained and armed to protect themselves against VC raids and reprisal......