Professional Soldiers ® - Village Defense: Initial SF Operations in Vietnam

AUTHORS CAVEAT

In order to better appreciate this outdated publication it must be placed in proper context. Special Forces Det A-113(-), 1st SFG, Okinawa was deployed to Vietnam in Feb 1962 to conduct a covert counterinsurgency “pilot program” with a tribal group. It was uncovered by war correspondent Homer Bigart who, on the front page of the 15 April 1962 NY Sunday Times headlined: “U.S. Making Army of Vietnam Tribe”.

For the next 30 days the Buon Enao program, as it would now be referred to, was overwhelmed with briefings and village tours by the US Ambassador (Ambassador Lodge), the CSA (Gen Decker), CINCMACV (Gen Harkins), CINCPAC (Adm Riley), ACS-Spec Ops (MG Rosson), CDR JFKSWC (BG Yarborough), Chief, MAAG-V (BG Timmes), and others. These visits, as well as “The Hidden War in Vietnam” part of the CBS Big Picture series, (which can be viewed on You Tube) were the catalyst for the expansion of Special Forces in Vietnam.

The following prose from a seasoned AP correspondent presents his take in a more romanticized fashion.

Quote:

"Live From the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad" By Peter Arnett

(Pp 294-95)...We were also captivated by the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, the “Green Berets”. I spent several days with Detachment A-113, one of the first Special Forces Units in the war zone, assigned to the Ban MeThout area of the Central Highlands plateau. This was a place of rolling forested hills and swift streams and was once one of the premium game hunting locations in Asia, but now the Vietcong were navigating the jungle leopard lairs and bear trails, traveling freely among the Rhade tribal population. The Green Berets were assigned to turn the tide in such regions, to stop the Vietcong in their tracks. They were secret and privileged, worked under the orders of the CIA and were generally independent of all military and civilian authorities in their area of operations.

Detachment A-113 had arrived in Ban Me Thout in 1962 in an unmarked C-46 transport flown by Taiwanese pilots to set up a village defense program for the Rhade, the largest and most advanced and intelligence mountain tribe. When the veil of secrecy was lifted, I was invited to witness the programs success: in a whirlwind of bold plans and initiatives the eight man team had organized the inhabitants of eighty tribal hamlets and villages. They supervised the building of bamboo fortifications and underground bunkers at each location and provided basic military training to young tribesmen, replacing their crossbows and spears with 4500 rifles. I was shown around by the tanned, rangy team leader Captain Ron Shackleton.

.....Then we met the locals, the tribal elders with their wispy white beards, puffing tobacco-filled bamboo pipes, young smiling militiamen proudly toting their new weapons, and the shy giggling women of the village dressed in dusty black and red traditional garments. I didn’t meet with the CIA handler who discretely stayed out of sight in a hut whenever I walked by.

The CIA had chosen the Rhade tribe as the subject of their counterinsurgency experiment not only because of their strategic location on the high Annemese plateau bordering Laos and Cambodia, but because they were basically a neglected people, ill served by the Vietnamese, who treated them as savages. The Rhade and other hill tribes responded with a baleful enmity for all Vietnamese, whatever their political persuasion, following the wind that blew fairest of all: they brought no historic prejudices, only resources and unbridled enthusiasm.

I watched Shackleton’s efficient team at work: the medic Sergeant Manfried Baier, dispensing simple but effective treatment to a people previously denied the basics of health care; the weapons men John Clark and Charlie Lindewald, patiently running through the practice sessions for automatic weapons with recruits whose fingers were so calloused from pulling strings of crossbows that they could barely get them on the triggers. The Americans brought other specialist skills; two of the team spoke Vietnamese and French, enough to communicate adequately with the locals. When I returned to Saigon I wrote a long, positive story quoting senior American military authorities as saying that the Green Beret program was “the most significant yet devised” to quash the Vietcong movement at the grassroots level, which was true as far as it went.

But in my mind it is the (Attached pdf - Meritorious Unit Commendation) that presents an excellent overview of the mission, conduct and accomplishments of the Village Defense Program that will make the reader better informed and therefore the book (Attached pdf - VillDef) more meaningful.

I would be remiss if I did not point out that when I received this assignment I had been a Special Forces soldier for only five months. It was the experience, knowledge and professionalism of my A- Detachment that carried me and to them the credit must go.

MSG John Slover, my Operations NCO, was an easy choice. John was a soft spoken stud of a man and often referred to as “Big John”. Square jawed and weaned in SF ever since the days of the Korean War, where he served in the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment. He knew SF inside and out; and at one time or another held every team position except medical specialist. He was truly a "Suffix S" (SF qualified); cross trained, with combat experience, disciplined and an outstanding leader. Respected and well liked he had a previous tour in Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Rangers.

SFC Manfried Baier would be my Med Specialist. He was a small, quiet and unassuming individual who had spent considerable time with SF before taking the one year medical course at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. In addition to providing medical treatment he was capable of performing battlefield surgery. He too was cross trained and well versed on all aspects of SF operations. His English had a strong German accent which was his native tongue.

I was authorized to take two communicators. SGT Lester (Les) Walkley would be the Commo Chief and SGT William (Bill) Beltch his assistant. Although both had limited SF experience they were both cross trained and knew their communications well. Walkley was a rather tall and impressive individual. Although outspoken at times, he was a very intelligent red head who later went on to OCS where he graduated first in his class and was commissioned a 2LT. Beltch was a small man with a quiet and relaxing demeanor. He was fluent in Vietnamese, having been the Honor Graduate at the DLI at Monterey, California. He too subsequently graduated from OCS and was commissioned a 2LT.

I selected SGT John Clark as my Hvy Wpns Specialist. He was a tall, blond and muscular young maverick who hadn't yet sowed his wild oats. He loved weapons and I considered him an ideal SF soldier. He always wanted to be in the thick of things. As a bachelor he often thought he was in love with every girl he met.

SGT Charles (Charlie) Lindwald was my Lt Wpns Specialist. He was young, heavy set and rather quiet - but very accomplished in weapons. He would volunteer for any chore if it assisted the Detachment. He was a two beer man who never became belligerent but just quietly crept away. After several subsequent tours in Vietnam Charlie, then a MSG, was listed as MIA in 1968; in 2004 his body was recovered. He had been awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts. His name now appears on the Vietnam Memorial.

SGT Alford (Al) Warok was my Demo/Engr Specialist. He was a robust, big man whose physical appearance didn’t typify a SF soldier. He had considerable time in SF. In addition to being cross trained, he was a Ham Radio Operator. He was loud and argumentative - but as my engineer, logistician and all-around operation base (SFOB) administrator he would be ideally suited.

As for me, when it came to SF, I was the greenest of the bunch. I often wondered how they felt about me right out of SF school leading them on a classified mission to Vietnam. We had been training together for five months, including a 30 day combined exercise with the Thais - but this alone would not foster the confidence and assurance of a more proven and experienced SF officer. However, I had hoped that my previous extensive command assignments, schooling and experience would see me through. This, then, was the eight man Detachment that would deploy to Vietnam.

Summoned to Washington to appear before a Congressional committee in March 1963 to present this operation, I was subsequently encouraged to document it if for no other reason than for historical/training purposes. By 1966 I produced such a document that took eight years of redaction, censorship, and rewrite-after-rewrite to ultimately publish the book in 1976, during which time I went from an A-Det commander to Group commander; and the Vietnam War had ended.

Void of the intricate inter relationships, discussions, identities and such which are so important to understanding how and why the program excelled, this book, I feel, still presents an informative “Field Manual” for such missions – as during the onset of the war in Afghanistan.

I indulge your patience and trust that you will find this book informative and enjoy it as much as I enjoyed living it.

Upon conclusion of this mission I determined that a Special Forces soldier was more than a warrior; he was also a humanitarian. As such I composed the following ditty:Attached pdf-Fighting Contradiction.