Combat FID the hard way?
 

Counterinsurgenterrorism
Obama's new policy for Afghanistan tries to steer a middle course.
By Fred Kaplan

Artical found here

I have seen this kinda of thing discussed here before, but breaking the 82nd up into what looks like squads and partnering them with an Afgan unit...

Can a 27+ year old 11B E6 Staff Sergeant be given a course on Combat FID and then just pull it off?...I imagine the QPs would say no, but mother Army seems to be saying yes.

Are we trying to block a hole in the dam with our pinky finger?

Scimitar

(DISCLAIMER: Any comparing of the 82nd Airborne to a pinky finger is purley a creation of the readers imagination) :D

I can't believe Barry's really going to try and pull this one off........:rolleyes: Who did he discuss this concept with? :confused: Biden???? :eek:

GB TFS :munchin

A few nights ago I watched the PBS Special "Frontline - Bush's War".

There was some great footage of Shinseki standing up to Rumsfeld regarding the number of troops required in "post hostilities" Iraq; also some not so great footage of Shinseki being sidelined for his efforts.

If this 82nd Airborne COIN thing is such an obviously bad idea is someone or more importantly a group of someones going to put their necks on the line and say so?

Perhaps there isn’t enough truly COIN educated officers in high enough places whose standing-up would mean something?

S

Once again into the breach...

USSF

http://www.gia-vuc.com/USSFMedics.htm

http://www.gia-vuc.com/A-104medcap.htm

USMC

http://www.capveterans.com/cap_marines/index.html

Richard's $.02 :munchin

If BHO is thinking about buying makes me wonder who is selling this nonsence. And how did it make it past SecDef? Bet its just "a guy who knows a guy who has a friend with a sister thought she heard . . . in his sleep . . . but anyway, maybe. . . . ":confused: And then Div Crds work long and hard to get to that position so I'm not believing he is going to say, "Yeah, GREAT idea. Let's break the whole Division into squads! Why didn't I think of that, Three?" :mad:Cuz its F-ing stupid.:p

I will give someone credit for reading their history books. This squad-level approach is similar to the TTPs used by the Army and USMC in the "Banana War" era. However, those men faced a very different opponent, in a different environment, in relative isolation and with different expectations.

And before there was a force already trained for this type of mission.

Crip

Frigging hilarious, And I agree that on the good/bad scale; it rates a bad. But hey there are guys way above our pay grades that make that division. I just hope they don't start calling these 12 man squads A-teams... and I thought I had a recession-proof job.

History can be an interesting mentor.

Aylmer Haldane, the commander of British Forces in Iraq, telegraphed Winston Churchill for more troops and airplanes. It was 26 Aug 1920.

"Jihad was being preached with frenzied fervour by the numerous emissaries from the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala," Haldane wrote. Churchill, Secretary for War and Air, sent him an encouraging note: "The cabinet have decided that the rebellion must be quelled effectually, and I shall endeavor to meet all your requirements."

Several days later, Churchill wrote Hugh "Boom" Trenchard, the head of the Royal Air Force, a memo. Churchill and Trenchard were developing the notion of policing the British empire from above, thereby saving the cost of ground troops - a policy that became known as "air control."

"I think you should certainly proceed with the experimental work on gas bombs, especially mustard gas, which would inflict punishment on recalcitrant natives without inflicting grave injury on them," Chruchill wrote Trenchard. Churchill was an expert on the effects of mustard gas - he knew it could blind and kill, especially children and infants. Gas spreads a "lively terror," he pointed out in an earlier memo; he didn't understand the prevailing squeamish about its use: "I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes." Most of those gassed wouldn't have "serious permanent effects," he said.

Haldane's men bombed and strafed rebellious tribes, fired on them with gas-filled shells, burned villages, and repaired the railway. The official death toll on the British side was forty-seven English officers and troops and 250 Indian Gurkhas. "It is impossible to give the Arab casualties with any approach to exactitude," Haldane wrote, "but they have been estimated at 8450 killed and wounded." Haldane offered his thoughts on how to deal punitively with a village. "Separate parties should be detailed for firing the houses, digging up and burning the grain and bhoosa, looting, &c.," he advised. "Burning a village properly takes a long time, an hour or more according to size from the time the burning parties enter."

Churchill wrote Haldane a congratulatory telegram: "During these difficult months your patience and steadfastness have been of great value, and I congratulate you upon the distinct improvement in the situation which has been effected by you." It was 18 Oct 1920.

Baker, Human Smoke, pp.7-8.

And so it went...

Richard's $.02 :munchin