General Failure
 

For those who know our senior leadership, is Peters onto something?

Have we created a Frankenstein of leadership with impeccable physical courage, but without the moral courage to do the right thing, fall on your sword, and let the consequences follow?

I have asked GOs before, if you disagree privately with the decision strongly enough, why don't you publicly resign? They all said pretty much the same thing. That other than the good soldier not questioning orders from superiors, they thought they had more influence on the issue by staying on board and trying to right the course.

Shinseki did not resign, but did get sacked for speaking the truth.

IMHO, Franks should have told Rumsfeld that entering Iraq with inadequate force, planning, and stabilization capability made it mission impossible. But he didn't.

http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol024fw.html

"Preserving the Army in the Depression years was his constant battle. In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt succeeded Hoover as President. With the advent of the new Administration, two new measures surfaced. Firstly, Congress proposed a drastic cut in the officer corps of the Regular Army MacArthur fought this tooth and nail and the bill was ultimately tabled. Then came the second onslaught in the form of an Executive Order from the President’s Bureau of the Budget. The Regular Army appropriation was to be cut by 51 per cent. MacArthur, along with the Secretary of War, requested a conference with the President. From his Reminiscences:

“I felt it my duty to take up the cudgels. The country’s safety was at stake and I said so bluntly. The President turned the full vials of his sarcasm upon me. The tension began to boil over. In my emotional exhaustion, I spoke recklessly and said something to the general effect that when we lost the next war, and an American boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his belly and an enemy foot on his dying throat, spat out his last curse I wanted that name not to be MacArthur but Roosevelt. The President grew livid. ‘You must not talk that way to the President’, he roared. I said that I was sorry and apologized. I told him he had my resignation as Chief of Staff. As I reached the door his voice came with that cool detachment which so reflected his extraordinary self control: ‘Don’t be foolish, Douglas; you and the budget must get together on this’.”

As they left the White House, the Secretary of War told him: “You’ve saved the Army”, and with that MacArthur vomited on the White House steps."

Where are our leaders today with moral courage, as well as physical?

TR

http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/...l-failure.html

General Failure

Some of our finest military combat leaders have commanded our troops in Iraq. Although they do not control the war's purse strings, Baghdad' political leadership or sway Congress'support, Yet they must share the blame for the mess in the Middle East — in large part for their lack of candor.

By Ralph Peters

There is only one test for a generation of generals: Did the men with stars on their shoulders win or lose their war? No matter the mitigating circumstances and political restrictions military leaders face, there is no "gentleman's C" in warfare. The course is pass-fail.

Despite including many fine combat commanders, our military leadership could fail in Iraq, defeated by terrorists, rough-hewn insurgents and shabby militiamen who understood America's limitations better than the generals did.

The generals point out that they don't control the strategic decisions, that all they can do is to follow orders, that then-secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wouldn't listen to anyone, that Congress undercut the military, that the media's behavior has been pernicious, and that Iraq's political leaders have failed their country.

Each claim is true. Even so, as the Army taught me, "The maximum effective range of an excuse is zero meters." Our generals must shoulder their share of the blame for the mess in Iraq.

An ability to disagree

Our current system of selecting generals produces George Pattons in bulk. But it hasn't produced another George Marshall, the general who had the ethical force to disagree — respectfully — with his president when victory was at stake.

Decades of observation of our generals taught me that battlefield lions turn to jellyfish in Washington. Our elected leaders, ever fewer of whom have served in uniform, do not get frank, direct and routine military advice.

Sixty years of misguided "reforms" emplaced multiple buffers between the president and his top generals. Given the number of White House gatekeepers today, the relationship that Gen. Marshall had with FDR would be impossible — unless the president wanted it, which today's presidents don't.

For their part, the generals are happy when left to their sandbox. In February 2003, when then-Army chief of staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, an honorable soldier, told the truth when asked how many troops an occupation of Iraq would require (hundreds of thousands), Rumsfeld sidelined him. (Thereafter, Rumsfeld took care to appoint weaker men to the Joint Chiefs.)

Retired from the Army and writing newspaper columns, I received no end of personal messages from officers who shared Shinseki's views. But not one of those who believed that Shinseki was right stood up to be counted.

When Gen. Tommy Franks failed to stand up to Rumsfeld and his ideology-driven deputies over professional issues as we prepared for war, I again heard endless complaints. Yet, even when Franks appeared to lose all interest in his mission, no fellow general called for his removal.

When Gen. Ricardo Sanchez — a deer caught in the headlights of history — made one fateful blunder after another as our senior commander in Baghdad, no generals insisted on his removal. Even now, when you ask another general about Sanchez, you get the Manchurian-candidate answer: "Rick Sanchez is one of the finest officers I've ever known."

We expected generals who would not police their own ranks to police Iraq.

A bold Army lieutenant colonel, Paul Yingling, recently published an article in Armed Forces Journal pointing out that a soldier who loses a rifle suffers a greater penalty than a general who loses a war. Yingling also suggests that many mid-level officers have lost confidence in their senior leaders.

The generals dismissed him, claiming that the Iraq veteran lacked their perspective.

Yet, who is more apt to have an accurate view of a conflict, the midlevel officer out in the streets, or the general in his air-conditioned office? That lieutenant colonel's article — admittedly couched in extremes — reflected what I've heard from hands-on officers for years. Insulated by staff sycophants, the generals are in denial (a humble general is as rare as a bashful porn star).

Our generals are members of a private club whose cardinal rule is that one general never criticizes another publicly. (Incest is OK, though. It always irked my peers and me that the general's aide was inevitably another general's son.) When a half-dozen retired generals belatedly criticized Rumsfeld's ghastly management of the war in 2006, the mass of generals closed ranks against them. It was fine for retired generals to do PR for defense contractors, but when a few spoke out against a disastrous policy, they were ostracized.

Country before career

The generals' greatest shortcoming, though, is that they failed in their duty to inform decision-makers as to what war means and requires, to give honest advice — and to keep on giving it, even at the cost of their careers.

A recent experience brought this point home painfully. In the course of a private discussion with a general who had performed brilliantly in combat, he blurted out that "Iraq is over. I'm worried about the Army after Iraq."

I was so startled that I failed to ask him the obvious questions: If he believes Iraq is lost, how can he remain silent as our soldiers continue to die? And why doesn't he share his conclusion with civilian decision-makers?

The tragedy — and travesty — is that we finally have a competent chain of command in Iraq. Gen. David Petraeus is doing the tough but necessary things that should've been done in 2003 and 2004. His immediate subordinates, Lt. Gens. Martin Dempsey and Ray Odierno, are remarkably effective officers and men of integrity. We have the best lineup of division commanders — the two-stars — we've ever had. Our troops are making meaningful progress on the ground.

War finally sorted the good generals from the bad.

But it could be too late. Congress might find the votes to pull the plug. And this generation of generals will face the verdict of history.

Sir, articles like this one are profoundly discouraging.

My view may be naive or uninformed, but as I understand it the role of a senior officer is as much counselor as planner and leader. In my civilian career, I've worked in that role as a consultant for years and I've learned one thing: that a trust-based relationship involving advice and counsel can only work when an obligation to dissent exists. That means from the most junior of my team members to me, everyone is expected to speak up and make their case factually and forcefully if they don't agree with an idea or course of action. This is important when decision making is fast-paced and hypothesis-driven, or else you run the chance of operating with blinkers on and squashing your own ability to see problems objectively and to deal with them creatively. It also means that if I disagree strongly with my client CEO, I will tell him so with equal force and stake the entire relationship on the outcome. I will fire any individual on my team in a heartbeat who can't or won't operate like that, no matter how smart or talented they are. Yet the military, which is in the business of providing our civilian leadership counsel on issues of life and death, doesn't seem to have a corresponding ethic.

I do not think that this problem exists at all rank levels, but at some point, it becomes necessary to have political skills and a "mentor" or sugar daddy to help you advance.

The system is, IMHO, designed to weed out those who would express dissenting viewpoints honestly and candidly, regardless of the talent or tactical skills.

As humans, we tend to prefer and seek out people who are like us, and that we like.

Anyone here believe that General Myers or General Pace would get into a shouting match with Rumsfeld (or any superior, for that matter), or resign if their advice were disregarded?

TR

No, absolutely not!

I had a very interesting conversation with one of the few GOs that had my complete respect right after I was selected for 06. He told me quite frankly that 06 was the last promotion any officer actually earns and from here on out it was very political and controlled by all the other GOs who either accepted you into or excluded you from their "club" regardless of your demonstrated performance and potential. The tone was friendly, but the warning was clear as I had mastered the unique skill of pissing off most GOs with whom I had ever worked. He saw my approach of being a soldier that just happened to be an officer as a handicap, I saw it as a personal philosophy. If you consider one of the most important things that an officer can do for his subordinates is to enable them to succeed, then a GO ,while he has to maintain his roots as a soldier, has to become a statesmen and politician in order to provide those who elect to stay in the trenches with all the tools they need to succeed. However, we seem to have not found many who have been able to master those skill sets while maintaining an azimuth driven by moral courage to do the right thing vice doing things right in accordance with the political arenas in which they all find themselves serving and to which many seem to elevate career progression and security over adhereing to those leadership skills and sense of duty to the men and mission they all initially focused on. Just my observation.

The problem is the perceived risk: reward ratio.

What is the risk for a given course of action versus the reward (or potential reward) for that action? Underlying this are our values – our core beliefs.

In the article, General MacArthur clearly saw the risk to American soldiers as having precedence over his own career. A different set of values might have come to a different conclusion.

Presently, our society tends to reward those who behave like Paris Hilton or Donald Trump with money and acclaim. It does not appear to do the same for those such as General MacArthur. Thus, we get what we pay for – i.e., we as a society reward a set of behaviors, consequently encouraging more such behavior. Therefore, to change the behavioral paradigm, we must change the value system of the overall society. Perhaps the challenges we’ll face over the next 10-25 years will accomplish that.

T-, Am I to read this that Peters thinks that Pete Schoomaker was weak? I know he wasn't a member of the Service Chiefs, but he was brought out of retirement by the SECDEF to sit in Shinseki's seat. What am I missing?..

IMHO, they dragged Schoomaker back because SecDef liked the alternatives even less, and he wanted Shinseki out ASAP.

I believe that SecDef was a fan of SOF.

Service chiefs are approved by the Senate. Schoomaker had been vetted before. He could make it without excessive trouble.

BTW, I like GEN Schoomaker, but I did not see him jump on any grenades during his tenure. The Blues and the ACU uniform decisions were poor ones.

The service Chiefs are much less important than the Chairman. I doubt that Rummy called a lot of meetings with the full JCS to get input.

Of course, I did not write the article, so I could be completely wrong.

TR

Is Powell the only GO that tried to tell Bush and Rummey the truth????


Jim

He was not a GO at that time.

GEN Shinseki told Congress, so I presume that he had already told the SecDef and likely the POTUS.

TR

I know Powell was a retired GO at the time....but he did voice his opinion...... and it wasn't what Bush and Rummey wanted to hear......


Jim

Sir, this is an outstanding turn of phrase. I hope you don't mind if I use it in the future.

I am not an officer and do not "know" the political aspects of that job (there are enough at the senior NCO level as it is). However, after coming back from a year in the box, I did have the opportunity to observe decisions made by GOs that directly affected my Soldier's missions. How they came to their decisions really made you wonder about their decision making process. In addition to the political nature of the GO, I think their decisions are often made based on their staff input. This to me can only exacerbate poor decisions if that staff feels obligated to tell the GO what they think he/she WANTS to hear rather than what he NEEDS to hear.

Now I am not slamming the Officer Corps as a whole because I have worked with outstanding Officers who understood the balance they had to have to effectively lead Soldiers without putting their OERs in front.

If this report is an indictment of the GO Corps, then where is the Backbone? Where is the NCO Corps? I feel that there are quite a few SGM's out there who are equally at fault for failing their Commanders or worse their Men!!!!!


If we had never worn the Green Beret before (if it were Nonexistent) and someone wore that thing to formation today, in front of POTUS no less, He'd be Drawn and Quartered before anyone knew it. The PC times have damn near Neutered anyone who has a voice, and wants to see any kind of retirement.

Good thing JFK put something on paper for US, or we'd be wearing purple or something!!!!!!!


Rage over......Flame away!!!!!
:D :D :D

Definitely a valid point. The senior NCO Corps is unfortunately subject to the same political/personality "requirements" that is influencing the GO Corps. The question is how to break the cycle and get GOs and their counterpart CSMs selected without having to rely on the "Who they know" system. I don't think the problem is irreversible, but it will take a major epiphany somewhere up the line to resolve the issue.

I was the briefing officer for GEN. Shinseki prior to him entering B/H. I had the opportunity to sit and brief him without my CofC hanging around and being a pain. He (Shinseki) was a very approachable man with great integrity and courage. He cared about the individual soldier and it showed in the questions he asked.

It was not surprising when he was fired by SECDEF Rumsfield, though it was dishearting. GEN Shinseki stood up for what he thought was able to leave with his integrity and honor.

In 1996, my boss was a Colonel who came out on the one-star list. He attended charm school and his demeanor changed immediately. He was no longer as interested in the tactical operations, he became more interested in meeting with the local politicians and appeasing them. IMHO above the grade grade of Colonel you are a politician. Watch the evening TV you see them every night.

Enough said but they sell themselves out to Congress to be promoted. Therefore they sell their soul.