Terrorism and Insurgency
 

Any ideas as to how to better deliniate between terrorism and terrorist acts carried out as part of an insurgency?

I like your question very much. However it requires more than an off the cuff discussion. I'll be back.

Excellent. I'm looking forward to it.

I'm looking forward to the discussion, may not add much but am here to learn:

Terry

LOL - yeah right. Have to be manana, client call.

Ok Jimbo, I'm ready to be your Huckleberry. First, how about we talk about why we need to deliniate?

OK. We need to deliniate because in order to defeat either one, we need to understand the nature of the problem. We don't want to treat a symptom, we want to treat the illness or injury. Terrorism in support of an insurgency is just a tactic, terrorism as a strategy is a different beast.

That's why.

Ok.

Since "terrorism as a strategy" implies an internal decision - how will we know?

The matter is somewhat complicated by insurgent use of propaganda to mask any true intention, but I think a fair way to tell is to see if the insurgents take and hold territory and implement the changes they advocate in said areas.

People often give away what they are thinking without saying it.

Yes they do. However, let's take the FARC. They say they want to change the government (then lay down weapons and go back to farming), yet they take and hold territory and kidnap and bomb civilian targets.

If you ask them about the terrorism, the response is usually, they didn't want to, it was forced on them - a recurrent theme in a lot of cases.

As I understand it, terrorism is a tactic. But terrorism is defined (in part) in the other thread as being "politically motivated."

I am having a difficult time thinking of a politically motivated use of terrorism that cannot be defined as part of an insurgency.

Maybe an isolated incident of "lashing out" by a dissatisfied person or group, as opposed to a sustained campaign intended to replace the government? Can't think of one right now . . .

A significant amount of the terrorism that occured in the 60s through the mid 90s was not part of an insurgency. N17 in Greece, M19 in Colombia, Baader-Minehoff in Germany, ETA in Spain, IRA in Ireland, etc... Those are just off the top of my head. I don't think any of those groups made an effort to control territory beyond a few city-blocks at a time.

Terrorism, as a strategy (i.e. an end in itself), is called nihilism. The Aun Shinrikyo comes to mind. So do numerous 19th century Russian revolutionaries, such as Chernychevsky and his cronies.

But some of the groups you mention above do have some end-state other than total destruction, they just vary as to the means of achieving them. Recall that Marxism advocated spreading by "spontaneous uprisings." Although Lenin, pulling from others, eventually took a more organized approach to revolution, pure Marxism essentially said that there was a great tension in the working class, and there would be some event that would eventually catalyze the tension into spontaneous revolution. Much of the terrorism of the 60's was this kind of Marxist groping - attacks meant to put a spark to the tinder of working class tension (that didn't turn out to be there). As long as the group has a coherent ideological objective, whether or not holding ground is their goal seems to me a relative inessential for the purposes of classification - at least at the macro level.

IMO, the appropriate classification is by the end-state the group wants to bring about. If it is destruction for its own sake, then I think "nihilistic terrorist organization" is the appropriate category. If it is the recapture of land and elimination of a physical enemy (e.g. - the IRA), then I think some political description is appropriate. If it is to bring the world into Dar al Islam at the edge of the sword, forcing all to submit to Allah's will (as interpreted through the gang of priests that want to see all of this brought about), then I think "militant Islamic terrorism" is the right category. The end state a group is seeking is the best key to understanding their motives, what tactics they are likely to employ and against which targets. The ideology is the key to understanding the end state.

D9, excellent post.

We may be able to make a Special Forces soldier out of you yet.

TR

I disagree completely. While it is important to know a group's stated goal and the philosophy behind that goal, one might argue that what the groups actually DO is much more important in combating them.

Yes, the IRA said they wanted England out of Ireland and that they had an 'army' to help them accomplish that goal. However, tactically, they never progressed beyond terrorist attacks. With the exception of a few blocks on occasion, they never held any territory. I can not think of one single insurgency that achieved any degree of success without controlling some amount of land.

This is also wrong. In the business, groups that you describe as nihilistic are more commonly referred to as "apocalyptic"; Aum Shinryko, followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, Turner Diary adherents. These are groups whose goal is to bring about the end of the world. (Many of these groups reference the Book of Revelations without conscious effort)

The Marxist groups that you note were, as far as I can tell, using terrorism (coupled with some propaganda) as a strategy to being about the spark in the proletariat.

Nice post Jimbo.

I disagree about ETA though.

D9 - Terrorism as a strategy doesn't equate to "i.e. an end to itself."

Regarding "terrorism as a strategy," perhaps I misunderstood Jimbo's original meaning. I took that to mean that terror was the overarching goal, the purpose, rather than a means to an end. So let me restrict my original statement about strategy, and just say terrorism for its own sake is nihilistic.

I don't see the conflict with Aun Shinrikyo. If the intent of the terror is to satisfy some other-worldly goal - i.e. there is nothing the groups are pursuing on earth but destruction - then for all practical purposes it is nihilistic. In fact, I would say that nihilism is the broader category to which the mystical apocalyptic types belong.

I am not advocating that one look at what a group's stated goals are (their "nominal" ideology, if you will) to the exclusion of what they actually do. A group may explicitly state some populist or class-warfare manifesto but in their actions betray a different, more petty and criminal motive (FARC comes to mind, but I am no expert). I am saying, to the contrary, that you should be able to categorize a group by inducing their motive as identified through their actions. You misunderstand me if you think I mean that we should just trust whatever BS propaganda motivation the terrorists claim to have in their speeches.

An example are the sundry Palestinian terror groups, who endlessly bemoan various small grievances against Israel (the latest settlement, incursion, whatever) as the motive for their suicide bombings, but whom you can be reasonably sure have the expulsion of non-Islamic influence from the entire region as the overarching goal.

If I am a terrorist leader, what I am going to do next has to depend on my long-term goals. Long terms goals are set in relation to values - explicitly or implicitly held. The value in this context, being the state of the world I hope to bring about through my terror campaign. What I am saying is that it is this end state that we have to try to identify, and by which we should classify terrorist groups. The way I think you identify it is by discovering the set of "ideas" that the terrorist defines as his ideal. This is what he will pursue. You identify his goals through his actions - of course - but a person's actions will tell you a lot about what their ideas are (i.e. his "actual" ideology). It is the terrorist's ideas that are most relevant to classifying him, as opposed to whether or not holding land is a primary goal. This is because the whole purpose of classification, as I can see it in this context, is to formulate a course of action to deal with them. I can think of no more relevant criteria in formulating this course than what the terrorist's ultimate goals are.

I am not saying that whether or not they want to gain and hold land is unimportant - and certainly it is in the context of an insurgency. But the fact is that there are terrorist groups who are perfectly content not to (Al-Qaeda et al) and who we must deal with nonetheless.

Ah ha! I think I have found the disconnect. D9, you are mirror-imaging. As we all know, you are a highly principled person and you loathe pragmatism. However, not all terrorist leaders are as principled as you. Some are, and those tend to be the ones with whom negotiation is futile (thats when you break out 'Getting To Yes'), very many are pragmatic. Depending on what their actual personal goal is (staying in power, not getting prosecuted, not getting cornholed in an Afghan prison) they may sacrifice their group's stated goals or principles in favor of a newer, more pragmatic course of action depending on the new situation in which they find themselves. Now you get into evaluating their situational awareness, but I think I've taken up enough room already.

Carlos Castano and his dealings with drug lords comes to mind.

Yup. And even now, he seems to be pursuing a goal of his own over the (now) modified goal of the AUC. Decommissioning? Redemption is a powerful motivator for Catholics and those with no family left.

I think we're really haggling over semantics, and a different idea of what an ideology is. Pragmatism is an ideology also - specifically, it is the ideology articulated and named by William James, John Dewey, Schiller, and others. It is in our vocabulary today, whether or not those who utter it realize it, because at the turn of the twentieth-century it was an explicit philosophy popular among the literati and intellectual "elite." Pragmatism is not an alternative to an ideology, it is an old and important one itself.

It is important, I agree, to know whether your opponent - in the sense of a group - is a band of pragmatic criminals. You would deal with someone like this very differently than a Aun Shinrikyo, or an Ayman Al-Zawahiri, which is my entire point. But enough on this, we probably disagree less in essence than in terminology.

But there are no groups. Just collections of individuals. Each with thier own biases, hopes, agendas, principles and faults. How each person acts affects teh dynamics of the whole. Dynamic, often chaotic; it goes beyond classifications and ideologies.

Disagree Jimbo. In the beginning there are no groups, only individuals. If the leaders do their jobs, later there are no individuals, only the group. How rapidly we forget the lessons on the psychology of group dynamics and the human need to belong. The military is a perfect example. Try being the only non-HALO qualified guy on a HALO Team, or the only guy on an NG Team that hasn't been to the Q. I'd rather take a whipping with the buckle end of the belt.

Everyone has their limits and the vast majority of people who are attracted to the groups we are discussing are not nearly as professional as you and your brothers. Their group dynamics are the same to a point, but very divergent after that point. Some call the human need to belong "need for affiliation" and in some individuals that is stronger than the need for power. Thus, leaders and followers are born. Everyone posseses these traits, just in vaying amounts.

Well I KNOW that! That's what I just said. The fact that they are not professionals, IMO, means they need it even more. Given this, how can you say there are no groups per your previous post?

Re: Terrorism and Insurgency
 

From the definitions thread:Are the effects of "terrorism" vs. "terrorists acts carried out as part of an insurgency" different to the intended audience?

Good question.

Welcome!

Thank you. Glad to be here and ready to learn. :)

Need what even more? Affiliation? Some do, some don't. I'll write more on it tomorrow.

Re: Re: Terrorism and Insurgency
 

For the most part. Depends on the symbolism of the target.

I'll be anxiously awaiting your return so that I may crush you - I've been studying group dynamics all day.

A group is a collection of individuals. Al Qaeda is not an individual. Is it helpful to dissolve the concept of them as a group? How would one even begin to formulate any kind of strategy this way. I guess you could have said the same thing about the Nazis in WWII. It's a good thing the leadership then realized it was a group - otherwise we'd probably be speaking German. Pretty bizzare IMO.

With the exception of targeting specific facilities, which in the GWOT has not proven to be terrible effective, it is exceedingly difficult to target a group of people as a whole. For the most part, the best you can do is fight a perception battle with them. The option you are left with is to target individuals.

I do not understand what you are saying here.

Whose perception are you referring to: local perception of the group, group's perception of the local population, group's perception of the target, target's perception of the group, outsider's perception of the group, outsider's perception of the target, outsider's perception of the group's supporters, all of the above, none of the above? I mentioned to you before, re: semantics, perception and ideas, that one of the main defenses for a US terrorist seems to be to convince the jury that the person was not really a terrorist. I'm wondering about the importance of propaganda in all of this and what affect it has on the victim (and the choice of the victim) of the act of terror.

Read this, but start on page 5 the beginning is irrelevent. Group dynamics as a dicipline is way overrated. Go to the unit level and work your way out, I say.

Everyone's.

LOL - it may be overrated in Cambridge, but here on the ground, its alive and well. Thanks for the link (nice buying of time), I'll be back.

That paper is about the leaders, not group dynamics. Interesting stuff though.

In context, with regards to terrorism, I think we have to remove the leaders. Its the group that I'm not sure can be eliminated and therefore requires the deeper analysis.

Thought I forgot about you didn't you? Here we go:

The motivation for joining an underground movement is typically complex. Usually, persons join because of a combination of interrelated factors, most frequently personal and situational in nature. Ideological or political reasons seem to have inspired only a small percentage, and propaganda promises appear to have had little effect. Although coercion alone is only a small factor, coercion coupled with other positive incentives is a significant factor. Government persecution, real or imagined, also leads people to join the insurgents.

An insurgent’s motives for remaining in the underground seem often to be quite different from his motives for joining. He develops loyalties towards friends and comrades, or may be influenced by the indoctrination and other propaganda. Close surveillance and threats of retaliation often make it difficult to withdraw from the movement or to defect to the government forces. Simple inertia may keep him in the movement.

Toma y Tenga
 

Group membership Serves to satisfy several types of individual needs: patriotism, the sense of “belonging,” recognition, and enhancement of self-esteem. Strong organizational ties protect an individual from external threats and offer him an opportunity to achieve economic or political goals not otherwise attainable. Group membership does a great deal to condition and mold an individual’s behavior. For example, group membership in an underground provides a set of standards, so that an individual always knows implicitly what is right or wrong, what can or cannot be done. Underground membership structures and narrows an individual’s exposure to perception of his environment. Because his view of life, of events, and of news is colored by his feelings and behavior, group organization also conditions attitudes and perceptions.

A variety of factors affect the degree of influence underground membership exercises over individuals. Small cells or working groups exercise more effective control than larger ones. Frequency of meetings and length of membership affect the development of intimate relationships. The more highly structured the underground and the more clearly defined the relationships and duties, the greater the influence exerted.
Underground movements have been described as “normative-coercive” organizations, employing both persuasive group pressures and overt coercion. They are normative in that institutional norms and mores secure behavioral conformity to certain rules and group membership satisfies certain individual needs and desires. However, coercive power is applied through the threat or application of physical sanctions, or through the deprivation of certain satisfactions.

I have a paper that deals with this, too. But I only have it in hardcopy. It was the subject of the last Insurgency Board meeting. The paper was quite controversial.

As to your contention that the last paper I put up was about the leaders and not group dynamics, I respond thusly:
1) Leaders are often the catalyst in group dynamics. When it is not the leader himself it is the leadership position that often acts as a catalyst and by that I mean someone more motivated by power seeks the position.
2)While that paper only discusses leaders, you can apply the principles to anyone. By doing a full-on analysis of the leader, those in his information environment and some of those in his out groups, you pretty much come up with a map for group dynamics.