Let's talk about Secretary Rumsfeld
 

The following comments made me think this might be a good topic.

So, is Secretary Rumsfeld doing a good job or not? What are his strengths and weaknesses as SecDef in your view?

My mother always told me that if I couldn't say anything nice, I shouldn't say anything at all.

I'm sure GEN Franks, GEN Shinseki and all those other 4-stars who didn't want to be Chief of Staff have an opinion, though - and are more free to express it.

There's something about him that rubs me the wrong way. I can't put my finger on what it is, though.

I like him. But what do I know?

I like him too. Shinseki gave the legs a beret, I don't care what he thinks. General Schoomaker and General Boykin are willing to work for him, that's enough for me.

Do they really have a choice? Sure, they can retire, but I would think that when you get that far along, the brass ring is pretty tough to give up. I know it is in my world.

:munchin

GEN Schoomaker was already retired and came back onto AD to work for him.

LTG Boykin could have retired easily from his previous job, had he not wanted to work for him.

Do not assume that they could not have been very successful upon retirement from the military.

TR

I'm not making that assumption. My only point is that there has to be some very significant attraction to getting a job at the very apex of the military.

I've got a theory about that.

Basically, if you have served honorably as a General, particularly if you have commanded at the four star level, what do you have to lose by speaking straight, telling the truth, and taking care of the troops?

Frankly, I think the two officers you mentioned are of like minds.

Probably explains why I will never reach that rank. :D

TR

I would think the opportunity to advance, unfortunately. :(

Sounds like the military is not that different from other organizations in that respect. I prefer your suggested course, personally.

From my perspective, and only my perspective, you are making an invalid assumption if you are clumping those who are in SF with the rest of the "military". You see, for those of us that were in this business before SF became a branch, we were treated as leppers by the rest of the Army and career progression was never in any of our minds. We just believed in each other, what we did, what we were called upon to do, and looked out for each other. I would also think that your catagorization of the military as an organization might be correct for some branches that look upon the military as a job, but SF is a profession and as a profession requires a commitment made by professionals to the core values required for the execution of its missions. That is why I find the name of this site so appropriate. Quiet Professionals is not just a catch phrase but a gathering of warriors that share a common commitment to something that is larger than self bound together by experience, respect, patriotism, and profession. If we progressed up the ladder, it was not because we did not stand up and fight for what we believed in. It was because those for whom we fought produced results so astounding that we received undue credit for their efforts.

Jack Moroney-need to stop drinking coffee earlier:D

Again, I say that a man who is wearing four stars and has commanded up to and including USSOCOM has no advancement by returning to AD, even as the CSA.

The only reason to do that is to serve, help your nation, your Army, and your brother warriors.

Duty, Honor, Country.

Not just words, Counsel, get it?

TR

I like Rumsfeld.

1. He had enough faith in Special Ops to let the Afghanistan plan be executed despite the objections of the conventional Army.

2. He brought General Schoomaker out of retirement.

3. He got the Air Force to switch mission priorities so that Close Air Support is now their number one priority.

4. He is ramrodding the reorganization of our military in order to create more flexible organizations with a better tooth to tail ratio. Something that I think was long overdue.

5. He is actually taking on the conventional cold war mentalities head on.

6. He is paying attention to realities that have existed for a long-time, but which no one has been willing to admit (like the fact that if North Korea comes south, the only way we can defend South Korea is with nukes).

Yes, thank you.

Is the answer different below the 4-star level?

In your experience, are all officers motivated strictly by "duty, honor, country," and not by ego? That would surprise me a great deal.

Now this is getting personal. I don't think anyone here can answer that question about anyone but themselves and the pleasant or not so pleasant experiences that they have had with others. I must admit, however, that your inference that those of us that might just be motivated by "duty, honor, and country" really do not exist and have separate agendas surprises me and would like to know what shaped your perception. Not so much because you might think I am offended about what you think about me, you see I really don't give a damn. Never gave a rats ass about what anyone thought about me. So would you like me to draw inferences of what I think motivates members of the legal profession? As the likely hood of my strolling along the halls of justice in your wing tips are just about equal to the likely hood of your slogging through the hinterlands in my combat boots neither of us would be qualified to make judgements about what makes the members of the other profession tick. We both have lowlifes in our professions and not only cream rises to the top-turds also float. While I cannot talk to your contemporaries I can talk to mine and I can assure you that in my case those folks that worked for me that consistently failed to meet the exceptionally low standards that they set for themselves are now doing something else. Can I say that is true about everyone, no I can't and I have been overruled in some cases because I stepped in someones toes, but then I never could dance and really wasn't interested in learning.

Jack Moroney

This reminds me, regarding Rumsfeld and stupid reporters.

During early stages in Afghanistan with more major operations, at one of the briefings some reporter was insisting about "cluster bombs" and how dangerous they are yada yada yada...

If i recall correctly Rumsfelds answer went close to this:

"Well of course they are dangerous, we are at war and are trying to kill people"

Please accept my apologies; I believe I am being misunderstood.

I did not say that there are no officers who are motivated solely by duty, honor and country. I would hope that all are. I was suggesting only that there are other considerations that may motivate behavior, including the desire for personal "achievement." I also speculated that officers who make waves by always doing what they think is right may be at a disadvantage relative to those who punch tickets and follow the party line. This speculation is based entirely on what I have read, and I was looking to people like you and TR for your views on the subject. I certainly do not claim to know anything about the military.

I'll back out of this discussion now. Again, I meant no disrespect.

It appears to me, and I'm not sure that I even qualify as a casual observer here, that Mr. Rumsfield has percieved the nature of the conflicts that we are currently facing and made some valuable adjustments.

I have no idea how you engage a stateless enemy, if Mr. Rumsfield doesn't he has at least positioned some very capable people who do. He also seems to be adept at listening to their advice.

Mr. Rumsfield seems to me to be very good at thinking on his feet. Taking the heat when he needs to and adapting as the situation(s) demand.

I like his straight forwardness.

Abu Gharib and the Shiite upraisings and some very critical portions of the 9/11 report have put a lot of heat and bright light on him and he has responded with grace.
He has taken the heat and let responsible people do their jobs and so far it is working. Isn't that what good leadership is?

I like him because he's not afraid, especially of the press.

I like him because he actually acts upon his convictions and those of his trusted advisors. Translated.. He does his job, which is to LEAD the defense department, not just keep the status quo.

OK, I will stir the stick:

1) Stryker - good idea or bad? Shinseki fought tooth and nail to get it past Rumsfeld. Discuss.

2) Iraq invasion force levels - were they high enough? I love you special ops guys and all, but is it possible that someone can be a bit too enamored with special ops? Discuss the adopted plan for Iraq vs. Tommy Franks's original war plan, with emphasis on the security situation we face today and traditional occupation responsibilities of an Army.

I am curious as to your viewpoints as SF types and supporters.

1) I am not a Shinseki fan.

I would have liked to see a couple of new Motorized Divisions added to the TO&E, not sure I would have bought Strykers.

The Army is understrength and inadequately resourced for the present mission.

2) I would go the opposite track, and said that the key to post conflict success in Iraq would have been MORE SOF.

IMHO, the conventional force was scared silly of what SF did in Afghanistan and sold itself to the leadership as the solution in Iraq.

I would have preferred to have seen us raise a resistance movement (or two) with our hand picked leaders in charge, legitimize them (like we did Karzai and DeGaulle), and provide sufficient conventional force to support a popular uprising. We could have done this pretty easily in 1991, and much less painfully.

Having said that, despite Franks' best efforts, there was insufficient to marginal forces on the ground for the Plan, piss poor log support, and criminally inadequate resources for the post-conflict desired endstate.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

My 2 cents - I don't like Rumsfield, but he's competent and gets the job done. He also strikes me as a smart ass. I'l take a competent smart ass over a do nothing yes-man any day. He's not there to be liked. He's there to do a job.

I've been wondering why this wasn't done. I never gave a thought to the conventional Army getting scarred that someone was taking over their turf.

Don't know shit about the Stryker except that I hear there are problems with moving them via C-130 in Afghanistan.

Regarding Iraq invasion force levels, I think they were adequate given the logistical support and "size of the pipe" available. I think that it is unlikely that larger forces could have been supported with the demonstrated logistical support.

Occupation forces are, in my opinion, too large. Primarily due to the reasons already identified by TR, the unwillingness of the conventional Army to think outside the box and use SOF in an appropriate and effective manner. I figure that one ACR and one Brigade of the 101st with aviation support, plus one Group of Special Forces would do a more effective job than what is being done currently.

Gentleman, thank you for the SF perspectives - I really don't get those in my world (which could explain why I find myself here from time to time).

I have ZERO clue as to the big-picture integration of SOF in Iraq - but agree that unwillingness to think outside of the box is an Army-wide issue - and is likely severely limiting results from not only you folks, but also Civil Affairs types.

I find it interesting that the top Army men under Rumsfeld are all SOF types - but am concerned that a lot of depth of understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and intracacies of conventional forces is lost (with an obvious increase in the same for SOF, of course).

There is just too much parochial bullshit across the board - then again, I'm sure it has always been that way.

Adam:

Does this clip from his bio look like a guy out of touch with the conventional (Heavy) Army?

TR

Early in his career, General Schoomaker was a Reconnaissance Platoon Leader and Rifle Company Commander with 2nd Battalion, 4th Infantry, and a Cavalry Troop Commander with 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany. He then served in Korea as the S-3 Operations Officer of 1st Battalion, 73rd Armor, 2nd Infantry Division. From 1978 to 1981, he commanded a Squadron in the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - D. Following Army Command and General Staff College, General Schoomaker served as the Squadron Executive Officer, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany. In August 1983, he returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to serve as Special Operations Officer, J-3, Joint Special Operations Command. From August 1985 to August 1988, General Schoomaker commanded another Squadron in the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - D. Following the National War College, he returned as the Commander, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - D from June 1989 to July 1992. Subsequently, General Schoomaker served as the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, followed by a tour in the Headquarters, Department of the Army staff as the Deputy Director for Operations, Readiness and Mobilization.

General Schoomaker served as the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command from July 1994 to August 1996, followed by command of the United States Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina through October 1997. His most recent assignment prior to assuming duties as the Army Chief of Staff was as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, from November 1997 to November 2000.

Also, for those who may not be aware, Rumsfeld retired from the Naval Reserve in 1989 as a Captain. He went to college on an NROTC scholarship and was a naval aviator on active duty for three years and as a drilling reservist for 18 more. Then 14 years in the Standby Reserve.

Because of his business background and his role in pushing defense reorganization, he is often compared to McNamara by his enemies. But while McNamara spent almost his entire preofessional career as a corporate executive with Ford Motor Company until Kennedy tapped him for SecDef, Rumsfeld has had a diverse career with experience in Congress, the Executive branch, diplomacy and business, much of which was focused on national security. In national security and government affairs, he is one of the most experienced person to have held the job, in the company of Henry Knox, Henry Stimson, William Howard Taft and George C. Marshall (I might add James Monroe, but he was only Secretary of War for 5 months).

As Secretary, Rumsfeld has ruffled a lot of feathers, especially among the uniformed ranks in the Pentagon. His personal style is certainly a factor, but given what the SecDef's job is, ruffling generals' and admirals' feathers is part of the job. What is surprising is not that he has critics, but how unfettered his critics have felt about publicly expressing their criticisms. In some cases, it has almost reached Article 88 levels. I don't know if this is a legacy of the Clinton Administration (both in the contempt it engendered among many soldiers and in its political favoritism in some promotions) or if such things happened before and I am too young to know or remember.

On a few specific issues:

1. The cancellation of the Crusader program: the Army has always been odd man out on the big-ticket high-tech weapons systems so beloved of Beltway bandits and Congressional appropriators. We don't have the big ships and glamorous fighter planes. The Navy gets "Top Gun"; we get "Firebirds". The Crusader was our Joint Strike Fighter or Trident SSBN. In an ideal world the Army would have the Crusaders it needed to replace many more Paladins. But we are not in an ideal world, and when it comes to priorities, SP howitzers aren't at the top of the list.

2. Large conventional forces in general and the Iraq war plan: Much of the McNamara comparisons are due to Rumsfeld's perceived preference for high-tech weapons over boots on the ground. That, and Eisenhower's New Look (hence the critics of GEN Schoomaker's reorganization plans who compare it to the Pentomic Era). On this, I think there is some room for criticism. The Afghanistan model is not going to work everywhere. But the generals who claim vindication over the woes of the Iraq occupation are also revising history a bit. While I can see where TR is coming from, the Iraq war plan attributed to Rumsfeld's whiz kids of an Afghanistan II probably would not have worked. But the Desert Storm redux pushed by GEN Shinseki and others, with 500,000 troops, probably would not have been feasible either, for the reasons outlined by GH and those set forth in GEN Franks' book, most importantly, speed and initiative. Neither a cumbersome set piece conventional battle nor a UW strategy relying heavily on local forces would have guaranteed the kind of speed and shock GEN Franks thought necessary to get inside Saddam's OODA loop - sorry for the cliche - before the Iraqis could employ the unconventional weapons everyone thought they had ready to fire. Obviously, it would have been preferable to have 4ID rolling down from the north to meet 3ID and the 101st at Baghdad, but the diplomatic failure here with Turkey is not one that falls on Rumsfeld's Pentagon or the armed forces, but on Powell's State Department.

3. The occupation: Here Rumsfeld's Pentagon deserves some criticism. There appears to have been the triumph of hope over reason, with insufficient planning for the contingency if the rest of the world didn't provide the necessary manpower. On this point I both agree in part and disagree in part with GH. A better-focused and oriented US force structure would be preferable, but more boots on the ground were needed. The question is, whose boots? The Administration's failure was in not foreseeing how inadequate international contributions would be, especially from countries usually big in multilateral peacekeeping like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (although in terms of combat power the Dutch battalion probably has more punch than a Bangladeshi division would). But the real unforeseen manpower shortfall may have been unforeseeable, 20/20 hindsight notwithstanding, which was the utter collapse of the Iraqi security apparatus. Ambassador Bremer has been criticized for abolishing the Iraqi armed forces and internal security forces, but these units had ceased to exist long before their formal disbandment, with the Ba'athist officer corps all that was left. We found ourselves starting from scratch rebuilding the police and border guards, while having to do entirely too much policing and border patrolling ourselves. The result was a two-fold problem: first, US and coalition forces were wasting too much time retraining Iraqis and conducting basic law enforcement themselves, diverting resources away from more important tasks, and second, the porous borders allowed Syrian and Iranian-backed terrorists and agents to flood into the country. And some of the actual compromises made as a result, such as then-MG Petraeus' use of Sunni Arab tribal militias of dubious loyalty to patrol the Syrian border, rather than Kurdish peshmerga, and the rehabilitation of Ba'athist officers to run the Fallujah Brigade, end up biting us on the ass.

On balance, while quibbling with certain decisions, I think Rumsfeld has done a good job. He has done the most important thing, which is placing the national security interests of the US first and foremost. He has shown leadership and resolve. And, for a SecDef, I am not sure that having lots of people in and around the Pentagon unhappy with you is inherently a bad thing.

Believe me sir; having had the privilege of hearing the man speak last year, I believe he has a keen understanding of much if the Army as a whole - and our problems. "Out of touch" is truly not a word I would use. Still, his last real troop time with conventional formations was as an ADC for 1st Cav - a one star billet. His only commands on the conventional side were at the company level (I'm gathering this purely from what you posted, as I did not know prior to this - so I may have missed something above) - . Relative to Generals who have commanded brigades, Divisions, Armies, and Corps, that is a lack of breadth.

Again, I stress RELATIVE to the other generals.

I don't doubt he is the right man for the job, it is just hard for me to not imagine there are intricacies and subtleties in the Pentagon maze that he would have trouble with. On the plus side, he definitely has the respect - and therefore the ear - of the Secretary of Defense. That alone is likely worth its weight in gold for the Army.

When on June 25, 1942, he was designated Commanding General, European Theater, Dwight D. Eisenhower had never commanded a brigade, division, corps or army, and had only briefly commanded a battalion.

On Sept. 1, 1939, George C. Marshall was named Army Chief of Staff. His highest prior command was of the 5th Infantry Brigade from 1936 to 1938.

Gordon R. Sullivan did command the 1st Infantry Division, but no corps or army command.

Harold K. Johnson never commanded a brigade or higher combat formation. He did serve as commandant of the Command and General Staff College, though.

Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. had extensive command and staff experience, but until arriving in Vietnam to command MAC-V, it was almost entirely in armor. Not a lot of breadth there.