Pot Stirring
 

Given, the utilization of most of the soldiers in Iraq as infantry or MP type forces, typically patrolling and providing security,and the overutilization, burnout and impending shortage of those forces, at what point would it be approporate to ask the Air Force or Navy (other than the Marines) to provide forces for those missions or divert part of their force structure for that purpose?

There are historical precedents for this, BTW.

Just looking for some thoughts.

TR

I think its a good idea. Spec Ops and Infantry troops don't IMO do a very good job of these types of activities. Base defense is art and science, but these troops get bored and its not what they signed up for. AF is pretty good at guarding fences.

Re: Pot Stirring
 

I don't know. Can we really send joe shit the sailor/airman to do base security/patrolling? How much and what kind of training do they need? Maybe if it's in the calm areas more geared towards the multinational division run by the Poles and the Brits down south. That's the only place I can see them working. Something like this would be fiercly resisted by the brass I think. What type of units would they come from? Seabees (already alot of them in country)? Air Force Engineer types?

Which ones?

On the other hand, if some program like this was put in place, would it be volunteer?

i.e., Seaman Snuffy, the admin clerk aboard the USS Gaylord, is bored in his present duty assignment, and can request to go to Iraq as base secuirty? Who does his job then?

I'm not current on this, but at one time the USAF had Security Squadrons whose job was to secure airfields, both fence pacing and perimeter patrolling. They even sent a large group of them through Ranger School at one time (had their own class, I believe). If those sorts of units still exist they would be appropriate for some of the security missions fulfilled by Infantry units in the Middle East.

Re: Re: Pot Stirring
 

I think so, with the right training.

I recently completed a training exercise at Camp Guernsey, WY and in my dealings with their range control personnel learned that the Wyoming NG had already reclassified several units (formerly Artillery) as Military Police. They set up a rapid training program to x-train these folks prior to deployment.

Obviously, there are some issues that would need to be worked out as far as specific tasks to be trained, quality of training managment, and adherence to established standards. Certainly we can take an operating system within a unit, an established chain of command, and train them to complete security forces missions.


My question is, have we aleady exhausted all of our options for using National Guard and Army Reserve forces already trained to do this role?

mp

I am no expert on the intricacies of the US Air Force, but I was told by an airman brother-in-law that there are actually more Security Forces personnel in the USAF than there are infantrymen in the Army. Sounded like a bit of an exaggeration to me, but hell, sounds like the perfect folks for the job.

Allow me to express my deepest sympathies in this your time of woe. My condolences to the bride as well.:boohoo

Actually, it's really cute. He's my woman's little brother, and he... well, he joined the Air Force. But I get word that he just got busted with one of them naked-type girls hidden in his barracks room. There may be hope for him yet. :D

They are already "retraining" NG units to perform basic infantry missions. The 86th FA from the VTARNG has been retrained for security missions, convoy duty, etc. so it really cannot be that difficult to train AF and Navy folks to do similar operations, especially for point type security or isolated areas such as pipelines rather than wandering around thru the populated areas. I think that Army and USMC folks are better suited for that up close and personal stuff with Iraqi counterparts to help offset language problems and the constant cultural snafus that seem to be a problem.

Jack Moroney

No time soon...
 

T, Good question. I don't see it happening in the immediate future. The focus right now is the 30 June handover. It'll be interesting to see what happens after that, but I don't see any major changes in American forces or force structure in the foreseeable future as a result.

Not that a shitload of APs and/or SPs couldn't be brought in to provide some kind of security assitance. But let's be honest.. the Zoomies would claim it's time for 'crew rest' and the swabbies wouldn't want to get their shoes dusty... so I guess security requirements will remain on the shoulders of soldiers and Marines until we hand it off to the 'Racki's...
DOL
//cc

There is an article in a recent stars and stripes about national gaurd troops, giving classes in weapons, and movement and survival to a bunch of airmen, in Iraq. Kinda looks, like someone listened to TR.

Blind leading the blind?:D

IRT some of the questios asked, no, the Army is not out of people, yet.

If we keep these missions up, we will be soon though. The extensions, outsourcing (contractors), mobilizations, early returns, and Stop Losses are indicators that we are running out of options, or, as GEN Shinseki warned, have a 12 Division (actually more) strategy with a 10 Division Army.

This was actually meant more along the lines of stirring discussion of whether the US Military is properly structured to fight the sort of wars we are engaged in, whether the Army force structure is adequate, and whether it might be time to ask the other services to pull more of the load here or reallocate resources.

No doubt lots of jobs for AFSOC, Security Police, airlifters, SeaBees, SEALS, and Marines, but what are the submariners and fighter jocks doing right now?

I agree that with some training, the other services personnel could pull static security. Not sure I want the pipefitter E-3 trying to kick doors and discriminate fires.

Just a few random thoughts, but with the grunts scheduled to be deployed to the Combat Zone 12 months of every 24, and SF doing six in, six out ad nauseum for the forseeable future, not an inappropriate question to ask, IMHO.

Thanks for the feedback!

TR

Did you call me, Reaper??? While I will not profess to be the expert on this particular subject.....I do have some particular knowledge......

I went to the AF ABGD school in TX. Fun stuff.....only the basics, not much more than that. We cops are all given this training now as a rule, it used to be a seperate course.

They teach us the elements that most Army folks get in Basic training ( I assume that this is the case....I shall expound to clarify).

We get patrol tech (including observation posts), land nav, radio/field telephone, ambush, convoy, building clearing, perimeter defense, etc, etc.....also all weapons, to include grenade launchers, etc.

And no, we DO NOT just stand at the gate, dammit. :D

The premier ABD folks are out of Ramstein if I remember correctly.

Oh, yeah, that reminds me!!

I forgot to add that the AF convinced the underemployed Army to assign Army NG and Reserve soldiers to secure AF bases here in CONUS.

Wouldn't want the Sky Cops doing menial work like that.

Might get their blue uniforms and white gloves dirty.

TR

And you know they have been doing a fine job up here. I go to Hanscom AFB about once every 5 weeks for my Class I resupply and these folks look sharp, take their job seriously, actually seem intent on doing a good job.

Jack Moroney

All Inter-service rivalry aside, when I was in I always thought Air Force Security was tops. If they are using Army personnel now it is probably because they are short handed.

I'm not so sure our troops are burned out. I saw a bit on the news where mommy and the LYB were whining about conditions in Iraq. On the same piece they mentioned the high rate of extensions and re-enlistments among the troops. Many troops enlisted to do a job and doing that job is usually a good morale builder. Those held on a short leash and not allowed into action have the lower morale.

I can attest to the fact that morale among SF in Vietnam was much higher than that at Ft. Bragg during the same period.

I wouldn't want to go through a door with him either, but how about that E-3 welder who did a kick ass job during the Jessica Lynch ambush. he Killed 8-9 people including a whole mortar team who was trying to drop rounds on his unit. I'd have him in a patrol with me.

True he seems like the exception rather than the rule, but I've gone out on missions with plenty of support people, and for the most part they do an excellent job, and are quick to learn.

Just a quick thought on my part.

As has been noted before, there is a world of difference between defensive ops, and offensive.

I just said that they could pull static security, but I wouldn't want them kicking doors as part of a stick. You are certainly entitled to a differing opinion. Go out to the flight line, and pick your breacher.

Guess we will have to agree to disagree on this one.

TR

To paraphrase Austin Powers, allow me to reduce myself to a caricature of... myself:

There are, give or take, 24,600 enlisted personnel in the Air Force with the Duty Air Force Specialty Code of 3P0xx (that includes all Security Forces AFSCs). That includes everyone from gate guards to dog handlers to SPs to ABGDs. For officers, there are 936 31P's. Career Management Field 11 (Infantry) has more than that (I want to say around 40-50 thousand, but that's just ballpark), although even there you have drill sergeants, recruiters and others not actually serving in TO&E infantry battalions.

The combat controller/PJ/combat weatherman community is much smaller.

Air Force Security Forces are spread out worldwide in small units. Each base has a Security Forces Squadron, while for deployments task-organized Expeditionary Security Forces Squadrons are formed. If you're talking about deploying these guys and gals, the analogy is not to infantry - it would be to pulling the MP companies from the various forts and deploying them. We've done that before - I remember in 1995, around the time the Haiti and Somalia deployments were winding down and the Bosnia deployment was getting started, something like 80% of CONUS MP companies were deployed overseas.

Oh, and the brilliance of the Army bureaucratic mind at work: while the MPs were away, enforcement of traffic laws got a little lax. When the MPs returned from the sun and fun of Port-au-Prince, someone in Building 4 decided their reward for a job well done was to go and man speed traps on I-185 and VD Blvd for "Operation Slowdown".

I'd hate to say it, but I think you must draw a distinction between your average Airman and your average Soldier.

I think some of the disagreement between Max_Tab and The Reaper here stems from this distinction not being made.

I would roughly estimate that 80% of support soldiers could step up to the plate and serve adequately in an infantry role. I would have to say that this falls nearer to 20% for the Airmen I know - and that is only considering attitude (mindset) and aptitude, not the other serious issue of physical fitness.

There is a differance between advanced special forces training and basic soldier skills. With the right leadership and training, many, (not all by a long shot) support soldier's will step up to the plate, especially junior enlisted. I've gone out on patrol with mechanic's, cooks, signal guys, and other's, and if you give them a good left and right limit they did there job. No I wouldn't go into a room with them, or trust them to go out by themselves and set up a drop zone, but with proper guidance, they help out alot. Sometime we are so short handed, that we need all the help we can get.
Just like training g's, and that is our job.

I disagree.

I think less than 20% of the soldiers I see in the COSCOM could serve adequately as an infantryman, maybe less. I would give 10% of the Air Force. Certainly A6 can come to the party and show us what she has. I would count her as probably part of my 10%.

Max, I believe that you are referring to SFG and SOSCOM support personnel, which are two time volunteers and a world apart from the units across Bragg Blvd. (and those are in the Airborne COSCOM).

I believe that as a senior SF soldier, I could train them to pull static security and VERY limited patrolling, and that only under direct supervision. Frankly, I would rather have indigenous LATAM forces.

Have you recently worked with the Gs we get for Robin Sage? The Cadets make better Gs than most of the support troops do.

TR

No I haven't, done that in 6 years:D

My two pesos
 

TR,

Sir, I'd like to say that the Navy would step up to the plate but you never know. The only ratings/units I see that would have some very basic knowledge would be the Seabees, Naval Coastal Warfare Units, MAs (Master-at-Arms), GMs, etc. I'm sure I am missing some others too.

There also might be other individuals with the right type of background, which could serve as a starting point, i.e. small arms training, basic marksmanship, etc., but normally these individuals are the minority and have served in certain unique billets that mandate a particular skill set. However, there would still need to be a massive training effort to get everyone up-to-speed and know the basics even with some of the groups I mentioned above.

Seabees might be the most logical choice due to their base defense training, patrolling... etc. I would like to think that if the call went out that there would be quite a few sailors stepping up to the plate to volunteer. It was my impression while in that there were/are a lot of us Squids that enjoy/ed the more physical aspects of the military, e.g. boarding parties, security, shooting, etc.

Bottom line, a shitload of training would need to happen to get everyone on the same page and I’m not sure how effective it would be in the long run.

CTA3 out

The problem with taking certain support types away from their jobs to patrol is WHO is going to do their jobs while they are gone? I agree with CTA3's assesment of the Seabees, the one's I was around were good dude's and could probably acquit themselves in a defensive role. BUT who is going to dig wells, operate equipment, etc while they are outside the wire?

Within limited constraints it IS a good idea, but if you aren't careful you'll rob Peter's HR Dept. to man up Paul's HR Dept......

Good post Doogie - agree with the Peter/Paul analogy too. It could be feasible, but there would be a lot of logistics, training, etc., that would need to be well thought out in advance. As I said, from an individual perspective, I don't think there would be a problem with people volunteering for this type of duty but I've been wrong before.

"Could" and "Should" have two different meanings... and there is always a price to pay. Always.

The idea has merit, but the penalties should be understood and accepted or mitigated.

In my opinion it would be a mistake to use non-combatant in a combatants role.

While they could give the appearance of a well defended base or fortification IMO if the enemy were to find out they could/would exploit this vulnerability to their advantage.

US military combatants are feared for a well deserved reason, they are trained and effective killers. To quickly train a non-combatant to serve in a combatants stead without all the requisite training the combat soldier receives is contemptible at best.

While I agree with Max that the non-combatants can be led, therein lies the problem. If the shit were to hit the fan and there were no combatants to lead the non-combatants it could easily turn into a one sided battle very quickly.

Anyone can pull a trigger, anyone, not everyone can fight and win against a determined enemy. To fight and win does not only take good equipment, but damn good training also and the will to win.

Max, While I agree with some of your posts I do not agree with using non-combatants in combat patrols. I for one, do not wish to rely on someone that thinks a 213 on their PT test is GTG, or is patrolling with a Special Forces soldier just so he can impress his CONUS girlfriend.

The Air Force and Navy (besides the SEALS) need to stay out of the ground combat. If we in the Army cannot handle the bad guys on the ground someone has screwed the pooch.

TS

Copy and agreed. Risk analysis and mitigation... nightmare from a project perspective and I can only imagine what it would be like at an organization level of armed services with this type of hypothetical....

CTA out

P.S. Someone always pays!:D

TS, just saw your post and concur... hope all is well.

Ok here is realistic but hypothetical situation.

You are going out on a mission where you know you will need to search a building. You want to get on the Objective as fast as possible and flood the building. You deffinately want a team guy on the gun, and you need to keep a driver with the vehicle. Let's say you have a full team, of 12 (which never happens) and four vehicles to pull outer security. If you only took team guys, that would leave 4 people to search the entire house. but if you put in a support guy to drive, that gives you 8 people to search the house. Now lets say you have a support guy who is shit hot, and know's how to use a .50 cal, you can leave him there, and that's an extra guy.
Now imagine trying to do all that without a full team and you understand what I am refering too.

In a perfect world you would only have to work with operators, and would have plenty of infantry support for the security, but in real life you take your chance and make do with what you got.

I think that what you are talking about is using "COMBAT TRAINED and QUALIFIED" Personnel to drive and man the guns, ie Ranger or Infantry qualified people. That would work !! I believe that what TS was referring to, was Cooks, Mechanics, and all manner of Support People, that have no business in that kind of arena, conducting combat patrols !!

Nope that's exactly who I'm talking about. Mechanic's, commo support guys, Psyops, CA, CI. I said if you were lucky, you got infantry support, but that is not always they case. When you can't get them, and you still have to go in, you use what you got.

Sir, COSCOM units and higher are derided not just by Combat Arms types, but by the majority of support types as well. It is not hard to avoid being assigned there - which usually means that only thoise who WANT to be COSCOM pogues stay there long.

Does your assessment hold true for the support soldiers in the 82d's line battalions, the FSBs, and the MSB?

Can't say, never worked with them.

Sometimes, bad soldiers are the result of bad leadership, if you know what I mean.

TR

The problem of manpower is two-fold. One is the immediate need for foot soldiers in the GWOT over the past two-plus years (not just in OIF, but in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and airports and railroad stations around the US). The second is the long-term transformation of the Army. The first hurts the second - units that should be nondeployable while undergoing transformation are instead deployed, delaying their transformation. The second harms the first - it limits the manpower available in deployable units. And the first harms the first - it's hard to deploy a unit to stand in an airport for months and then turn around and send it to Iraq.

For several years now, I have been arguing that we need a standardized rotation schedule for National Guard maneuver units - divisional brigade combat teams and separate enhanced readiness brigades (ERB) - that would allow 2 full brigades to be on active duty and deployable at any one time, but would ensure that once that deployment was over, the unit wouldn't be called up for several years (lest constant deployment hurt retention).

There are currently some 39 such brigade or brigade equivalents - 15 ERBs (7 light, 8 heavy), 22 divisional brigades (5-6 light and 16-17 heavy), the 92nd Infantry Brigade (Separate) and the 207th Infantry Group (Scout). They are on an 8-year training calendar, with a CTC rotation at the end of eight years.

Take a 36 brigade-force. Call up two brigades at a time for a six-month call-up, with the first month as train-up, validation and equipment issue, then four months as an Army ready brigade, and one month to demobilize. Stagger the call ups so the train-up month overlaps with a prior brigade's last ready month, so there are always two brigades on ready status - i.e., your brigade's train-up month ends when the prior brigade's demob month begins. In this scenario, any one brigade would be on active duty for 6 months and then off for 66 months, i.e. a six-year training cycle.

Would this regimen be too much for most National Guardsmen? Six months away from home and one's civilian job is a long time for many Guardsmen, but with the knowledge that it would only occur every 6 years make it easier to plan around?

There are also 15 separate field artillery brigades and 8 DIVARTY brigade equivalents, as well as at least two separate ADA brigades. If, as is planned with the active Army, many artillery units are to be converted to maneuver units, these 25 brigades would bring additional resources to the mix. You could have three-brigade call-ups, giving you a National Guard division-equivalent on active duty at any one time, or you could stretch out the call-ups to return to an 8-year cycle.

I haven't touched on National Guard MP, aviation and engineer units. We found during the fight over the Reserve SF deactivations and the "off-site agreement" on USAR combat units that governors and state adjutants general like the prestige of combat arms units, but will fight to keep their MP, aviation and engineer units, as well as medical, for state civil disaster and civil disturbance missions.

Currently, of course, far more than a division of Guardsmen is active. There are something like 60,000-80,000 active at any one time. But the deployments are somewhat haphazard - a company here, a platoon there - and are mostly for Homeland Defense. Putting together units for Iraq deployments has often involved deploying Guardsmen who had been called up for airport security only a few months before. A better organized system ought to provide the necessary manpower without irreparably harming retention.

Max, are you referring to SF Support and USASOC units like the 112th and 528th or "support guys" like a leg support unit? I ask becasue there is a big difference in the mindset and training of a 31C2S or 74B2S in an SF SIGDET vs. their "peer" in some leg Signal BN. I'm not busting on you, just seeking clarification.

My earlier posts in this thread were about these non-SOF support types. Maybe given enough training and time they can perform some limited defensive roles, but who is going to do their support jobs while Joe the engineer or commo guy is riding shotgun in a convoy?

One problem here is that I don't think that DoD ever counted on facing an insurgency of this magnitude ANYWHERE. It is one thing to call up tens of thousands of Guard and Reservists and keep the OPTEMPO high for the AD side when you are fighting off the 9th Mongolian Horde or retaking Seoul. Psychologically and politically it is another when those same troops are in a place like Iraq. We here may understand the need, but Joe and Jane Soccer parents will not; they will accept it if there is some grand life-or-death struggle for humanity like WWII, but I don't think they are too keen on something shadowy like terrorism.

The question is- now that the US is in this situation, how will it extricate itself or make do?

Out of curiousity- does anyone have a map of Iraq showing the extent to which insurgency has spread? It's hard to build an image based on what information the media provides.

Thank you,


Solid