Stirring stick and a bottle of soju: The next Korean War (or the one after that)
 

On SOCNET there was a brief thread on a Korean news story on the pending 2/2 BCT deployment to Iraq. The story mentioned that the US was also considering redeploying some additional forces to the south of the peninsula, away from the DMZ. The plan to move more US forces south is in fact old news, pre-Iraq war, and is unrelated to the Iraq deployment. However, it reminded me of the strategic dilemma in US/ROK relations that this redeployment is unlikely to fix, and may actually worsen. I invite your thoughts and analysis.

The long term strategic dilemma in Korea is this:

For 50 years, we have defended South Korea from the threat posed by the North. Whether a million US troops in 1954 or 37,000 today, the main US mission was to defend South Korea. Other than to those troops, North Korea was not really a direct threat to the US (although the impact on our allies and economic partners of a regional war would be an indirect threat to the US).

Now, North Korea is seeking to develop nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States. If they do so, or are on the verge of doing so, then North Korea becomes a direct threat not just to South Korea or Japan but to the US.

Given this looming threat, the US must consider preemption, to destroy North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities at a minimum, or even to change the regime. But it is simply tactically impossible to destroy all of the North's offensive capability in one first strike, and our number one priority will necessarily be the nuclear facilities and missile launch sites that threaten us. Therefore, it is just as inevitable that North Korea will be able to launch at least some retaliatory strike or counterattack across the DMZ. Given the large percentage of the South's population living within short-range missile and tube artillery range of the DMZ, massive South Korean civilian casualties may be expected.

So this is the strategic conundrum: for 50 years, the strategic interests of the US and South Korea coincided. If the balloon went up, Americans and Koreans would die side by side to save South Korea.

Now, however, we are fast approaching the day when our strategic interests diverge. The US may soon be forced to make a choice where thousands of South Korean lives will be sacrificed to save thousands of American lives.

The nature of our relationship is changing, and for many South Koreans not in a good way. If you were a South Korean, and you saw the US considering a preemptive strike and moving its forces away from the main zone of retaliation, mightn't you become skeptical or cynical of our motives? What would your response be?* We may have to consider removing all our troops from the peninsula, lest they go from being a North Korean tripwire to being South Korean hostages.


_________

* The "rational" response, of course, would be for the US and the ROK to work together to defang the North to preclude preemption from becoming necessary, but this is an example of the prisoner's dilemma - what would be the rational choice for each working together may not be the rational choice for each working separately. In the classic prisoner's dilemma, each party ends up pursuing its own "rational" self-interest and each ends up screwing himself and the other.

I have a few preliminary thoughts and questions on this topic:

1. How much thought went into the provocative title, and in particular the first two words? Good luck. LOL I like the topic a lot.

2. What is the risk that North Korea actually would strike the US with ballistic missiles? Sure, the Dear Leader is crazy, but is he not trying to deter us from striking at him by acquiring strategic nukes? (NOTE: This is a question for discussion purposes, not necessarily a statement or suggestion of my position on the issue.)

3. What really is the probability of this strike to the south after a devastating US first strike? If we decapitate the leadership, won't there be confusion and chaos? Isn't the NK military even less disciplined than the Iraqi military under Saddam?

4. What about China? Isn't that still a BIG part of this problem?

5. I'd like to see some open source order of battle information.

Those last 4 are probably the same 4 questions being pondered by letter agency Asia desks on a daily basis.

AL - Yes to all your questions.

You forgot to tell him that you like the title too. ;)

I'd always been under the impression that the opposite is true, that the average North Korean trooper has been indoctrinated and brainwashed to the point of total and absolute obediance to orders.

It has been proven that the same cannot be said of Husseins forces, even at their best in the late 80's thru early 90's....

I would have much rather fought in Iraq against their troops last year than go to N.K and fight against troops that can live off one bowl of rice a day and hump their little asses off in the Korean terrain.

Having "played" in the DMZ circa 1978 and worked with the South Korean units that were stationed on our left and right as well as those within the joint security area I have always thought that the main reason for us manning that particular area was to keep the South Korean Army from forays into the North. While it was no secret that the US forces stationed along and in the DMZ had a limited life span at the outset of any North Korean initiated hostilities because of the massed Artillery and short flight time for its MIGs, the South Korean forces were well dug in and were looking for excuses to pull the trigger. You see, that was part of the plan. Use the US forces to secure the most likely avenue of approach into the South to ensure that the US would have to respond to the attack. That provided comfort to the South and acted as a deterent for the North. Having said that I think that you also have to consider both China and Russia as players here to keep North Korea in check. They really don't want that crazed, train riding, fear of flying, elavator shoe wearing, idiot to overstep his bounds by fomenting a nuclear exchange anywhere near their territory. As far as the feelings and concerns of the South Korean populace, those that were old enough to remember we pulled their chestnuts out of the fire are no longer in control of the country and have been marginalized. Those that still make a living farming the land and populating the countryside really don't give a rats butt about who is in charge as long as they can feed their family. I am not sure that you will hear anything but applause from those that are most vocal today because they think the only reason why the North has an Army is to defend itself from US aggression. Just my humble opinion.

Jack Moroney

North Korea needs a headache with the USA as much as we do. I call BS that they have the resources to attack anytime in the next decade.

Could they? Maybe. Will they? Doubtful.

Suicide never seems to be a State sponsored alternative. Terrorists, on the other hand....

The NK nukes are a lever against the U.S.

If the NKPA heads south, and the Glorious Leader has a delivery system for his handful of nukes, he may be able to influence U.S. participation in the conflict.

Sure, we can burn his country down to bedrock, after he pulverizes several U.S. Metro areas. One nuke popped on a U.S. city could easily end a conventional U.S. intervention and doom the administration.

Would we be willing to risk that? MAD worked because the other side was considered to be relatively rational. Can we say that of Kim?

That is why our missile defense is so vital. It would be inadequate for the Russian strike/counterstrike, but it could prevent that card from being played by nations with small numbers of primitive delivery systems, like NK.

It also allows Kim to divert attention of his people away from their poverty and revolt, and get some sort of nationalistic pride as he continues milking the situation trading empty promises to the U.S. for fuel and food relief.

He may go off the deep end and drive for Seoul one day, threatening us with his nukes. We need to make sure that contingency does not occur by ending his program, or making it useless.

NK has been isolated for so long, and improverished for so long, that they have few strat targets worth hitting. Are we going to bounce the rubble of a starving country operating at the peak of 1940s Soviet industrial technology?

China is NK's big brother and is the voice of reason to Kim. They are his primary trading partner, and could close the border and plunge North Korea further into the Dark Ages. Besides, if they wanted to, China could invade NK easily and seize the country militarily at a cost of maybe a few million troops, insignificant to them.

The NK military is huge, equipped along the lines of 1960s Soviet formations, with large numbers of relatively well trained SOF which would wreak havoc in developed South Korea. The AF is weak, but could be compensated for by tremendous quantities of artillery and air defense formations. The Navy is well suited to infil, sabotage, and harrassment of shipping, not power projection. Do some research and see for yourself. The Army is very impressive, and relatively well trained. The intent is to close with the U.S and RoK forces so quickly that it becomes impossible to target them without hitting our own forces, like a fighter in a clench.

Remember, Seoul is VERY close to the border, much more so since of the boom and expansion. Take a look at the map. One school of thought was that the ROKs would defend Seoul and if it looked like it would be lost, declare it an open city and fall back to the next line of defense south. The NKPA would then occupy, loot and pillage, negotiating a future withdrawal back across the DMZ only after taking what they wanted from Seoul and negotiating terms favorable to them. It is all in the timing. Would our Korean allies allow us to nuke the NKPA in Seoul? Would we risk a nuke strike on the U.S. to defend South Korea, even if our nuclear counter-strike burned them to death?

At this time, Kim appears to have firm control of the NKPA, and thus the country. If Kim remains firmly in control and relatively satisfied, I think we face no real threat but his weapons development. If he loses control of the military, we could have a coup and a move toward rapproachment with the South. If he feels that his position may be nearing a catastrophic end, he may choose to make further demands or to launch an attack on the RoK to occupy his military, strengthen his power base in NK, and to extort resources from the RoK and the rest of the world. That is the real nightmare scenario.

The U.S. 2nd ID was there North of Seoul to act as a trip wire for further U.S. involvement, to include use of special weapons as required to defend our forces, as well as our allies. Our presence communicated our intent (to NK, China, and the Soviets), in no uncertain terms to support our Korean allies and put our lives on the line with theirs. Last time we left an ambiguous alliance there, we left the opening for the war, similar to our gaffe in Kuwait. Realistically, all the ROKs really need today is probably Air Support.

I agree that the average young South Korean citizen has no idea of the evil intent of the North, the history of loss, or the thousands of gallons of U.S blood spent securing the South and chasing the North back across the border. They see the U.S. as occupiers and despoilers, we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. What the future holds for our alliance is uncertain, but it is, IMHO, likely to drift further apart.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

With the utmost respect.

That is what we thought Saddam was capable of. Are we overestimating our enemies? Does NK posses the capability that we should fear?

Yes, I fear the possibility they are capable of striking the border, much less our troops. But the International community, which in some nations is more credible than the United States, would make any strike by NK suicide. IMHO.

What makes you think we should worry about NK when the majority of the planet says they would be suicidal to act against ....the West?

With equal respect, and in comparioson to Iraq and their WMD, we know that Kim has some nukes, bugs, and gas, right now.

We know that he has a ballistic missile program able to reach Japan, as of several years ago.

We know that he is an irrational figure with some serious psychological problems.

NK is much more reclusive and isolated than Iraq, which had vibrant international trade and international ties. NK does not have these ties with anyone but China, and probably does not care what the world thinks, or does.

I think you underestimate the POTENTIAL threat, and all of its permutations due to the known factors above.

Just my .02.

TR

When it comes to WMD and irrational state actors, IMHO it is better to overestimate than underestimate.

Would it be feasible for US air power to successfully destroy a majority of firebases, missile emplacements, and airfields in range of the DMZ and the SK civilian populations?

Thank you,

Solid

Good discussion. So what are possible solutions? What would happen if China did close the spigot of trade with NK? Would they use that as an excuse to attack SK?

With conventional munitions after 50 years of digging in?

Surely you jest.


That would be a distinct possibility.

Think of it as a death spasm from an irrational leader with nothing left to lose.

TR

Would China commit troops if that happened?
Or sit back and watch.

Not an Asian specialist, but IMHO, the Chinese can pretty much be relied upon to act in their own self-interest above all else.

Why would they intervene with troops, and on which side?

TR

Thanks very much for your insight, TR.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...rea-crisis.htm

http://www.scramble.nl/kp.htm

http://www.csun.edu/~btk29323/keithr~1.htm

Seems like those F-22s would come in handy . . .

Echoing TR, no.

Numbers: The army has some 3500 pieces of towed artillery, 4400 SP guns, 2600 MRLs, 11000 AA guns and SAMs. Add in an unknown number of SCUD and SCUD variant TELs (maybe 50, with 500+ missiles). Plus, of course, Kim Jong-il has No dong.

Locations: Extremely mountainous terrain. TR noted the hardened targets and tunnel complexes, for which North Korea is famous.

Historical perspective (this deals more with interdiction than destruction of forward targets, and technology is better today, but still worth noting):

• From a CGSC study: "Notwithstanding the heavy damage inflicted by UN airpower, the overall air interdiction campaign in Korea had only partial success. The destruction did not succeed in significantly restricting the flow of the enemy's supplies to the frontlines, or in achieving interdiction of the battlefield.... Throughout the campaign, the enemy seemed to have ample strength to launch an attack if he wished. His frequent and heavy artillery barrages were evidence that he did not suffer from a shortage of ammunition."
• GEN Mark Clark's assessment: "...as in Italy, where we learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower could not keep a steady stream of enemy suppliers and reinforcements from reaching the battleline. Air could not isolate the front."
• Assessment of US Navy historians: "It must be grudgingly admitted that one of the key reasons why isolation of the battlefield could not be achieved in Korea was the surprising tenacity, determination, and ingenuity displayed by the Communists to keep their rail and highway networks in operation. In spite of incessant daylight attacks and nighttime harassment, despite the necessity of working at night, of using old equipment, of having long, exposed, and vulnerable supply lines, the Chinese were able to maintain and even increase the flow of supplies to the battlefront.... At no time during the course of the war did either the UN's surface or air interdiction efforts succeed in stopping the flow of enemy supplies from Manchuria to the front to a decisive degree. ... By every index, in fact, the Communists were able to steadily increase their flow of supplies to the frontlines. ... the enemy was never kept from supplying his needed requirements. At no time—except locally and temporarily—did the enemy limit his combat effort because of supply considerations."
• VADM J. J. Clark: "The interdiction program was a failure. It did not interdict."

Close air support took a second priority to interdiction, but the USAF still flew 250,000 ground attack sorties. The Navy flew 167,552 sorties and the Marines 107,000 (all combat missions, not just CAS). South Koreans, Australians and and South Africans also flew. Most CAS missions were direct support to ground troops.
I'm not a China expert either, but in analyzing all potential China war scenarios in the near and short term, I concluded that a Chinese war against North Korea is a distinct possibility. The scenario I envisaged was increasing instability in the North leading to mass waves of refugees (estimates of the current number of Korean refugees on the Chinese side of the border range from 50,000 to 300,000). The PLA decides to established a buffer zone on the south side of the river, leading to confrontations with DPRK troops. The increasingly erratic Kim orders a counterattack, and the PLA responds.

Is it technically a hijack if I'm keeled over laughing? :D

It is sad and amazing that regimes like kim long dong can exist in this day and age.

Oops I meant kim small dong

Just a few thoughts...

To be militarily devastating, a US first strike would have to be nuclear. The NK defenses are too many and too fortified to be effectively destroyed. The best bet for decapitating the leadership and preventing a move to the south would be to provoke a coup from within the military leadership. Like the Soviets before them, it seems unlikely that the senior military leadership are capable of actually believing the Party line. Given the choice of killing Kim and taking charge, or fighting a non-conventional war with the US (an interesting separate discussion - is a conventional victory possible for the 'good guys'?), I think they'll opt for the former.

My understanding of the NK Air Defense is that it is capable of bringing down most aircraft through sheer volume of fire (I've heard it described as Baghdad at the outset of the Gulf War 1 air war X 10), but I'm no pilot...

The F/A-22's stealth and supercruise features make it more difficult to shoot down than the planes we are using now. How much more difficult I don't know.

And you are basing this on...?

Those features are, largely, the whole reason for the F-22. However, I'm not sure that's the ideal.

That being, the problem with North Korea is not so much that it has state-of-the-art equipment that we need our pinnacle of technology to combat (although they do have some good stuff), but rather that they have so damn much of it, so well dug in. Anyone who has played around in that neck of the woods can tell you that you can't walk ten feet in the woods/hills without running into an underground bunker (and none of this dirt and timber stuff... we're talking about feet-thick concrete). Koreans on both sides of the border dig like hedgehogs, and have been planning out/preparing for the 'big one' for fifty years.

As such, I would say that it is not so much the need for a few F-22s as it is a need for a -lot- of F-15s and F/A-18s (and some A-10s for our boys humping in the hills). Our current technology is a good enough overmatch--I would rather buy, what, 3 or 4 Super Hornets for the price of one F-22? Pyongyang has quite a few air defenses, but the biggest thing to worry about if the balloon goes up is just getting there and pushing the bastards back up past the Imjin before they get too far. Just my opinion... YMMV.

I agree. I was just wondering what RL had heard about the F-22...or rather, whose version of the story he had heard. I probably should have added a :rolleyes: to my previous post.

This is a great thread. I have been reading about this situation ever since this thread opened and although I have changed my position a little on the potential threat of NK and it's leader, I am still trying to figure out what that wacko could possibly gain by attacking.

What goals would he have?
So he has taken the minds of the people off the poverty by building up his rather large military. Then what?

I still say it is suicide and would probably produce a larger coalition than what we saw in GW 1.

Then again, I could be wrong on the last part. I am just curious what he would be gaining. Yeah he might be a crazed lunatic, but they're not all nut jobs in NK, right?

You think I'm making this stuff up? :mad:

Try the contractor sites for a start.

In my opinion, should an armed conflict begin in the Koreas, the US will have no choice but to use nuclear weapons, and we haven't really had any choice regarding that in a long time (even under Reagan, I don't think we really had any other viable choice). The North Korean forces are too big, and the threat of Korean nuclear weapons in the case of war must be dealt with immediately (even if he says he won't hit us or Japan if we stay out, how do you believe him?). The movement of US forces south (in my opinion) simply shows an acceptance of reality. And the NKPA need to think about it that way. Come south? Fry. I see no other viable solution, not even giving up on South Korea works. This isn't MAD, because our destruction is not assured. Theirs is.

But given our respective tolerances for casualties, does it really matter?

Yep, particularly to them. A US administration might fall (and probably would), but not until the war was over (and failure to react would force the administration to fall anyway). It's a no-win situation for whatever administration it is, but the least risky response is to turn North Korea (or at least the NKPA) into steam and rubble.

But does that matter? I suspect we'd puss out, and even if we didn't, I doubt the Dear Leader would think we'd gamble the future of Los Angeles or San Francisco to save Seoul . . .

All of this begs another question. Do you think the US would go nuclear (and suffer the resulting disaster in public opinion/domestic politics) over South Korea? While there are US strategic interests there (including the US soldiers killed in the initial attack), they are not overwhelming. . . our primary reason for even being there (halting the spread of global communism) has since evaporated.

That said, yes, I believe that if the US committed itself to a knock-down drag-out with a NK invasion that did not melt like the Iraqi army, we would go nuclear. But I do not believe we would let it get that far. I'm sure there's an analyst wonk right now in the belly of the Pentagon writing a brief to the effect that, even in the worst case, the best policy would be for the US to pull out of South Korea, wait until the communists overextended themselves/killed off the SK economy, and then let them collapse. Which do you think the policymakers/politicians more fear, the overrun of Seoul, or the incineration of Honolulu?

RL,
I don't think the government would see a nuclear strike against NK as a strike to save Seoul, but instead as a preemtive strike in a future nuclear war that NK might want to start. It's a no-win situation- either we lose San Franciso now, or we lose it later. NK is not a rational state actor.

JMO,

Solid

x

What choice really exists?

First, I don't think there is any real evidence that Kim has any weapons that can clearly reach LA or San Francisco reliably. Even if he does, should he come south, all the bets have to be that he will use everything he has. The South Korean Army fights, no matter what, the economy of the South and of Japan are destroyed if we don't risk it... and that likely means a depression like the Great Depression. So, you have to fight... and the only way to have any chance in that fight is to go nuclear, and to destroy the NKPA completely... including any launch facilities they might have. In my opinion, North Korea having nukes has made the response options much less flexible. War starts? Destroy the NKPA. Completely. Really isn't any other viable choice.

Doesn't mean every President would do it, but the ones that don't? Will watch a disaster unfold regarding Korea and Japan and may very well still see weapons launched at the United States. Kim is not sane, not attacking him does not mean you are not risking LA or Seattle anyway.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...home-headlines

Bush Seeks Troop Reduction in S. Korea

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — The Pentagon wants to reduce its troop presence in South Korea by one-third by the end of next year, a far quicker and deeper troop cut than had been anticipated.

The South Korean government said today that it was notified of the troop reduction by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Lawless on the eve of an annual meeting between U.S. and Korean military officials.

The news apparently took the South Korean government by surprise, although smaller cuts were expected.

There has been much public fretting here lately about the psychological impact of U.S. troop reductions on financial markets and the economy, and about North Korea's ongoing development of nuclear weapons.

Kim Sook, head of the foreign ministry's North American division, said that the United States wanted to cut the 37,000 troops by about 12,500. Those cuts would include 3,600 soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division who are being redeployed from the demilitarized zone to Iraq.

Kim gave no indication of what the South Korean response was to the proposal, saying simply: "That is what the United States presented as their plan and we are going to discuss it."

South Korean officials quoted in the media have said they are pleading with the United States to delay the reduction until 2007.

The troop reductions are just one part of a global restructuring that is supposed to make U.S. forces more flexible and more mobile. For years, Pentagon officials have been unhappy about having large numbers of troops stuck at the DMZ, where they cannot be deployed to other trouble spots and would likely be trapped in the middle should another conflict break out with North Korea.

Among South Koreans, there is also a sense that the U.S. troop cuts are proof of a weakening U.S.-Korean alliance as a result of the left-of-center government of President Roh Moo Hyun.

"There was this binge of populist, nationalist anti-Americanism and now they are paying the consequences," said Lee Chung Min, an international relations specialist at Seoul's Yonsei University and a frequent critic of the current South Korean government. He said that South Koreans fear a weakening of their economy, such as occurred after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines.

"If the U.S. footprint here gets smaller by the day, there could be economic repercussions. One reason that foreign companies have been willing to invest in Korea is because of the strong U.S. alliance."

The U.S. troop presence at the DMZ dates back to the end of the Korean War. The number has been reduced repeatedly since the end of the war as tensions calmed with North Korea.

The last time there was a significant troop reduction in South Korea was in 1971, when the number was cut from 63,000 to 43,000. In 1992, another 5,000 troops were cut.

Check your PMs. :)

http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/23/air...eut/index.html

U.S. warned it could lose air supremacy
Friday, June 25, 2004 Posted: 9:48 AM EDT (1348 GMT)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -- United States must modernize its fighter jets to maintain air supremacy, a top Air Force general said Wednesday citing the success of advanced Russian-made jets against American planes in a recent exercise as signaling an erosion of its overwhelming advantage.

Gen. Hal Hornburg, head of U.S. Air Combat Command, said a U.S. air-to-air exercise with the Indian Air Force in February, in which India used Russian jets to defeat aging American F-15Cs, revealed "that we may not be as far ahead of the rest of the world as we once thought we were."

Defense experts in both the United States and Europe, however, have said it is unlikely that America -- with vast spending power and a major industrial base -- would lose its dominance in military technology.

U.S. defense officials have said Indian SU-30, Mig-27 and older MiG-21 jets, some armed with Russian-made AA-10 air-to-air missiles, got the best of F-15s based in Alaska in exercise "Cope India" high over northern India.

Hornburg said in an interview with military writers the air maneuvers emphasized his service's push for expensive, stealthy new F/A-22 "Raptors" being built by Lockheed Martin Corp. and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters being designed by Lockheed with input from allies.

He declined to discuss classified results of the exercise but said, "Something like Cope India, when we find that some of our advantages aren't as great as we thought they might be, leads me to remind people that we need to modernize our air-to-air capability."

Hornburg added, "We have been saying for a long time that we need newer fighters to do more things," and that the Indian exercise could be a "wake-up call" for Washington.

Russia's Sukhoi aviation works and the Moscow Air Production Organization company have been designing and building increasingly advanced fighters such as the MiG-29 in recent years. India, China and other countries are buying the warplanes -- some with contracts for co-production.

France and Sweden also build advanced combat planes and a consortium of four European countries, including Britain, are producing the Eurofighter "Typhoon" jet.

"I see air forces across the spectrum and across the world becoming better and better as each year passes. That just means that we have to do the same thing," said Hornburg.

"With air superiority, everything is possible. Without it, hardly anything's possible" he added. "People jump to the conclusion that it is ours just because we go. And that's blatantly false."