I'll be anxiously awaiting your return so that I may crush you - I've been studying group dynamics all day.

A group is a collection of individuals. Al Qaeda is not an individual. Is it helpful to dissolve the concept of them as a group? How would one even begin to formulate any kind of strategy this way. I guess you could have said the same thing about the Nazis in WWII. It's a good thing the leadership then realized it was a group - otherwise we'd probably be speaking German. Pretty bizzare IMO.

With the exception of targeting specific facilities, which in the GWOT has not proven to be terrible effective, it is exceedingly difficult to target a group of people as a whole. For the most part, the best you can do is fight a perception battle with them. The option you are left with is to target individuals.

I do not understand what you are saying here.

Whose perception are you referring to: local perception of the group, group's perception of the local population, group's perception of the target, target's perception of the group, outsider's perception of the group, outsider's perception of the target, outsider's perception of the group's supporters, all of the above, none of the above? I mentioned to you before, re: semantics, perception and ideas, that one of the main defenses for a US terrorist seems to be to convince the jury that the person was not really a terrorist. I'm wondering about the importance of propaganda in all of this and what affect it has on the victim (and the choice of the victim) of the act of terror.

Read this, but start on page 5 the beginning is irrelevent. Group dynamics as a dicipline is way overrated. Go to the unit level and work your way out, I say.

Everyone's.

LOL - it may be overrated in Cambridge, but here on the ground, its alive and well. Thanks for the link (nice buying of time), I'll be back.

That paper is about the leaders, not group dynamics. Interesting stuff though.

In context, with regards to terrorism, I think we have to remove the leaders. Its the group that I'm not sure can be eliminated and therefore requires the deeper analysis.

Thought I forgot about you didn't you? Here we go:

The motivation for joining an underground movement is typically complex. Usually, persons join because of a combination of interrelated factors, most frequently personal and situational in nature. Ideological or political reasons seem to have inspired only a small percentage, and propaganda promises appear to have had little effect. Although coercion alone is only a small factor, coercion coupled with other positive incentives is a significant factor. Government persecution, real or imagined, also leads people to join the insurgents.

An insurgent’s motives for remaining in the underground seem often to be quite different from his motives for joining. He develops loyalties towards friends and comrades, or may be influenced by the indoctrination and other propaganda. Close surveillance and threats of retaliation often make it difficult to withdraw from the movement or to defect to the government forces. Simple inertia may keep him in the movement.

Toma y Tenga
 

Group membership Serves to satisfy several types of individual needs: patriotism, the sense of “belonging,” recognition, and enhancement of self-esteem. Strong organizational ties protect an individual from external threats and offer him an opportunity to achieve economic or political goals not otherwise attainable. Group membership does a great deal to condition and mold an individual’s behavior. For example, group membership in an underground provides a set of standards, so that an individual always knows implicitly what is right or wrong, what can or cannot be done. Underground membership structures and narrows an individual’s exposure to perception of his environment. Because his view of life, of events, and of news is colored by his feelings and behavior, group organization also conditions attitudes and perceptions.

A variety of factors affect the degree of influence underground membership exercises over individuals. Small cells or working groups exercise more effective control than larger ones. Frequency of meetings and length of membership affect the development of intimate relationships. The more highly structured the underground and the more clearly defined the relationships and duties, the greater the influence exerted.
Underground movements have been described as “normative-coercive” organizations, employing both persuasive group pressures and overt coercion. They are normative in that institutional norms and mores secure behavioral conformity to certain rules and group membership satisfies certain individual needs and desires. However, coercive power is applied through the threat or application of physical sanctions, or through the deprivation of certain satisfactions.

I have a paper that deals with this, too. But I only have it in hardcopy. It was the subject of the last Insurgency Board meeting. The paper was quite controversial.

As to your contention that the last paper I put up was about the leaders and not group dynamics, I respond thusly:
1) Leaders are often the catalyst in group dynamics. When it is not the leader himself it is the leadership position that often acts as a catalyst and by that I mean someone more motivated by power seeks the position.
2)While that paper only discusses leaders, you can apply the principles to anyone. By doing a full-on analysis of the leader, those in his information environment and some of those in his out groups, you pretty much come up with a map for group dynamics.

1) Agreed, but that doesn't tell us why they follow. A shepherd without a flock is just a campesino with a stick.

2) I think you are saying that the group takes on characteristics of the leader, and I agree to a point. I also agree that for this reason, analizing the leader is useful.

I'll give you an exception, the FARC general membership has very little in common with Marulanda. Their recruiting base for middle management comes from the national universities.

Another exception - Che was an Argentine doctor from a middle class family. How many of the Cuban mass fits that description?

sounds like you're profiling there, Doc. This is precisely why I am not a fan of profiling. This is why, even though it takes a crap load of work, you have to look at each case as closely as possible.

LOL - of course I'm profiling. I do look at each case individually. That's why I've been working on basically two groups for the past 10 years. All LATAM groups have some things in common, I think because of the Cuban influence. And the commonalities are both on the government and guerrilla side in many cases. So I check to make sure they fit the base assumptions, then look at the anomolies, understand them, then accept the exceptions.

Problem is, the deeper I dig, the deeper I have to dig.


I would like to have Marulanda for about a week. I have some "What were you thinking...?" questions. Like the US missionaries in Arauca, the Nogal bombing, etc.

OMG, I'm turning into an intel wienie, I don't like it when they don't follow my roadmap!

I'm going to try to apply your leader paper to some personalities down here. Info can be hard to come by and I really don't want to have a PM interview with any of them on their terms. I'll send you the results.

Please do.