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There was a day we didn't "Go along to get along"... That's what made us "Special" per sey |
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I dont disagree with you... My frustration is that many of these folks want to be seen as visionary leaders with earth shaking discoveries when the fact is, when the lives of their men were at stake they went along to get along. They 'self served' their own career until they were "safe", THEN they grew balls and spoke out against the boss. ...could have been the greatest guy ever. Finding his conscience after retirement doesn't inspire me. |
An Incompetent War: Britain in Helmand
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, time to break out ye olde Official Secrets Act to once again squealch anything that contradicts the 'official' version of history?
And so it goes... Richard Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2014) “Fury Over MOD’s bid to ban Book”, “Captain resigns over Afghanistan book.” These are just some of British newspaper headlines that preceded the publication of An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict last month. If you don’t know the story, here it is in brief: a former Territorial Army Captain, Dr Mike Martin, was actually commissioned by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to read for his PhD at King’s College, London. In his final thesis he was to provide them with an independent view of the Afghanistan campaign; that thesis has since become this book. Whilst the MOD’s official objections concern the alleged use of classified information in the book, one can’t help but presume that this is a mask for the real source of anger, which is just how far Martin goes in criticizing the Ministry’s involvement in Afghanistan. ‘Killing the wrong people’, ‘complicity in corruption’, ‘indirectly funding their enemies’ and ‘sponsoring some of the most despicable people in Helmandi society to rise to the top’ are just a few of the charges being levelled at their door. Perhaps most cutting of all, however, is the underlying suggestion that this was all the result of a conceptual void which did not allow British military leaders to understand the type of conflict they were engaged in. (Cont'd) http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/an-...in-in-helmand/ |
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Nothing but great word on LTG Bolger, yet why does it seem that so many of these former, retired Commanders or leaders come out swinging once there out. I never heard of LTG Bolger while I was on vacation in Afghanistan, so I can't say anything.
But I feel these Commanders would have better if the would have spoke out more while on active duty. Heck look at Gen Mattis and how out spoken he was. “Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.” |
Even if we're not aware of it, I think a lot of these guys like LTG(R) Bolger do speak out while on AD (within their circles of influence and the accepted protocols of the profession) and are busy "fighting the fight" from within. Once they retire and have the time to reflect both personally and professionally, they seem to want to seek a broader audience, both within and outside their respective branch of service and outside of the various branches of the services themselves, and pass on their views and lessons learned to a much greater audience, including John Q Public, our political leadership, etc. Books like LTG(R) Bolger's are a proven way to do that.
One thing I learned as a commander, your focus on preparing and leading your unit to carry out its assigned missions forces your 'world-view' to become necessarily self-limiting and, therefore, limited, and it isn't until months or even years after relinquishing command that you become far enough removed to realize it, and can then reflect back with a deeper sort of "couldawouldashoulda" self-assessment that re-establishes that broader sense of context and greater understanding. Anectdotal, but my experiences and MOO. Personally, I'm looking forward to reading LTG(R) Bolger's reflections. Richard |
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An observation from my perspective; GO's are surrounded by retards. Here is how I've seen it, take a Division like 1st CAV, have numerous Brigades from all over the Army supporting that Division with each Brigade sending their top mouth breather (O-3 to O-5) up the DIVHQ at BAF to work as the LNO for their Brigade. Simple, top commanders are surrounded by the worst officers (and often times NCO's) from a huge mixed bag of units most of which do not fall under that command stateside. I've been doing the advisor thing now for 10 years in both Iraq and Afghanistan (where I am right now), from Division down to squad, and it has been hard to watch or to understand the breaks between the different levels of command. I've watched time and time again LTC's and COL's outright LIE to their commanders with absolutely no repercussions. I don't know Bolger or whatever the hell his name is but it's unimportant, they come, make big plans, rarely to never make good on those plans, leave and the next guy does the same. I was just a team guy, maybe I'm just not capable of fully appreciating the awesomeness that is command level occurrences but I do look forward to never seeing it again.
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my mistake
To get back on track for this thread, we lost because we fought 1 year wars while our enemy has continued to fight the entire time. We've used Infantry units to guard FOB's and Field Artillery units to conduct DA operations. We used MiTT teams to do SF missions and SF teams to do Ranger platoon missions. We do change of command ceremonies half way through a rotation so that no officer is left behind. This guy writing a book on why we lost....how the hell would he know?
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...after ten years of the same war, why aren't there any senior leaders at the GO level that don't need "years" of reflection to realize that the frontal assault was in fact an attack and not a ruse? ...Hacksaw, you are right on the money. |
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