Call me young and naïve, but this scares/worries/saddens me a bit… the term “was” implies the past, serving my country with other highly trained and self motivated men is why I am working so hard to earn a slot in SF. It is why I am not pursuing a career in the field of my college studies, as I am sick of being “worthless” and working with unmotivated amoral people who think the world owes them something or everything. I think I am doing this for the right reasons, I just hope there is some filter within the pipeline that prevents those with the wrong motivations from polluting what I hope to someday join.

JPH

That's a little bit out of context, I was speaking about when I came into SF..........it is still a place where these things do happen. As far as filter goes, that remains to be seen. You seem like you're more informed than some others, and I will tell you to let your conscience be your guide. If its something you really want to do then, make your decision and work hard at it remembering that the hard work doesn't stop when your done at the Q course.

My comments come from what I've been seeing lately from a majority of the guys. My point is that this should be a higher calling, and that your attitude and professionalism should reflect accordingly.

In other words work hard, and it will be rewarding. With the right attitude and professionalism, You Too can be one of those guys who others will call upon to do the special stuff, without questioning whether your right for the job or not!!!!

slightly late to the conversation
 

Gentlemen,

It appears I missed this conversation by two years, but I saw an article in NYtimes recently that I thought was relevant to the initial question in this thread.

My interpretation of the underlying issue from the start of this thread was if changes in the administration alters Special Forces motivation to complete its job - I would presume the explicit answer is no based on responses. I think a deeper question on this topic is if members of the military should not only have reasons for joining SF, but if they should also be informed on the reasoning behind operations and specific wars. A multitude of studies and experiments conducted to improve knowledge of organizational behavior, including from former professors and friends of mine at the University of Michigan, have found that organizations that take the time to explain the purposes of each employee's job within the context of a larger organization's mission, along with sometimes illustrating the outcomes of the organization's work, makes employees significantly more productive, both in terms of bang for buck and bang for time. (some studies have found increases reaching 50% boosts without any changes in pay)

This brings me to the article. John McCain's dissertation at the Army War College after Vietnam, according to the NYtimes, argues that the army should teach the reasons for specific wars/interventions to its soldiers - he alleged this would reduce the number of soldiers breaking under torture. Beyond the more obvious concerns - political indoctrination, politics mixing with military, emphasis on motivation being political rather than service oriented - I think it's an idea worth entertaining for this specific thread, as presidential priorities change with administration. For example, an interesting question is will motivation to complete missions in Iraq be impacted if a president opposed to the war is elected?

Moving the thought from inputs and outputs to outcomes, is it conceivable the civil-military effort in Iraq will be negatively impacted simply by having a president known for being against the intervention, even without yet changing a single policy? Would teaching soldiers the reasoning behind OIF offset that potential outcome? If that reasoning differed - for example, from a liberal/democrat perspective vs. a republican perspective, would the outcome differ, or would simply a reasonable explanation, regardless of its actual material, improve productivity or effectiveness? And if so, would these issues be simply constrained to conventional army, or would they stretch into Special Forces as well?

Sorry in advance if I have become too theoretical for this forum, but this thought process might keep me up late tonight, and I thought it might be conceivable there would be others seeking to discuss this topic as well.


The article on his dissertation is at the bottom, and its title is In ’74 Thesis, the Seeds of McCain’s War Views, released June 15, 2008 (the link will probably break in several months).
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/us...xA0NcvFDc+Mi4Q

First of all his paper was written in 1974 and like all military papers written in the various war colleges they are flavoured by the teaching points and assignments in the development of the paper.

Second, this has been done for years and is part of the curricula in our military war colleges.

Third, anything printed by the New York Times has been over edited to ensure that the liberal bias of the paper is not only preserved but that, if need be, additional information less than factual might be included to support their thesis which was more than likely developed before they wrote the article.

Fourth, had McCain not been running for president this would never have been published.

Fifth, motivation comes from within and not from political or military indoctrination.

Sixth, Soliders fight for each other and not for an administration. Once the mission is given and the battle is enjoined no one cares who is in the white house they care about taking care of each other and getting the job done.

Seventh, and the above six are just for starters.

Very good response Col Jack But why stop at 7 you were on a roll....:munchin

Big thunder storm was in bound-had to shut down and head for the bunker:D

Good Call!!!!!!

Wait until his head pops up again and continue the education process.:munchin

Col Moroney,

Thank you very much for taking the time to respond to my post. I apologize for not replying earlier, however I have been entrenched in studying for my exams to complete my masters. I have been keeping my eye on the 25 M target.

Frankly, I was hopeful that you would respond to my post. I have read many of your previous posts, and expected the topic to potentially interest you. I was a little confused about your response, so I will list my confusions/questions below.

Points 3 and 4: While I understand you may have concerns with the New York Times for media bias, I don't understand the pertinence of your attacks on the publication with my use of a fact from an article in it. Do you have concerns about the fact I used with regard to McCain's dissertation?

Point 5: I have no background in military history, however, I would suppose that morale/motivation has impacted the outcome of wars. If, as you suggested, the politics of a country (and therefore the civilian leaders of the military) do not impact morale/motivation within the military, I would be highly interested in learning what makes the military different from other public or private organizations with respect to this issue. Leadership direction often impacts the productivity of an organization. Are there specific criteria that make Special Forces/the military more resistant to these potential impacts on motivation?

Point 6: If you had to fight to defend the US on US soil, would that impact the motivation/productivity with which you fight? Would it impact the army or military? My initial thought is yes – thought it would be unintentional – I also imagine the situation would affect the extent of the impact.

Point 7: If you have other thoughts that could further improve my knowledge on this issue, I'd be interested in reading them.

I appreciate any input you or other writers on this forum might have.

Cheers,

Stu

Would you like to take something Obama wrote that same year, and subject it to the same kind of scrutiny? Perhaps after he had been imprisoned and tortured for several years.

Oh, that's right, you have to have a record to be criticized for it.

And a media outlet needs to publish the critique.

TR

Sure, I would be willing to take something from Obama and subject it to equal scrutiny, or more, depending on its ostensible importance. I think I understand the point - more research is being focused on the McCain's background than Obama's. I appreciate that point, and I wouldn't be quick to either accept or reject it.

A side point - If you take a look at the New York Times piece, I think it paints McCain in a relatively positive, or at least neutral light. They make it appear like his thoughts were rather astute for the time, and were shaped heavily by his experiences in Vietnam. Perhaps its me, but I thought the writing might make people more likely to vote for McCain.

However, I'm not really interested in who came up with the idea. If I were, I'd be writing/reading a political blog rather than a Special Forces forum. I'm interested in what you think of his idea, and if implemented, would it have implications on Special Forces, and perhaps the military as a whole?

Cheers,

Stu

We are all aware of the role of national will and the support of the American people in the pursuit of "diplomacy by other means".

While Carter and Clinton were the subject of morbid humor among the ranks, soldiers do not fight for their leaders, they fight for their brothers.

I would suspect that the political inclination of a President or other civilian leaders would have more effect on the enemy's morale and motivation than on ours.

I truly believe that a leader calling a war lost or declaring a timeline irrespective of battlefield successes borders on treason. If Lincoln had taken counsel of his naysayers, declared the war lost, or announced a timeline for withdrawing his forces, this country would be far different today.

TR

While I've read/heard that argument before, i didn't consider it while posting. Thank you for improving my ability to consider the complexities of this discussion.

You seem to read a lot into simple answers to complex questions. I did not suggest that the politicians had no impact on morale, as a matter of fact I did not mention morale at all. My point dealt only with motivation and the fact that motivation comes from within a person and is driven to satisfy a personal need. While extrinsic factors impact on or can even trigger that internal need to act it does not create motivation. However, the impact of extrinsic factors and their effects on motivation varies from person to person. Do not try and equate the lessons taught in business schools on leadership and productivity to the military-they are for the most part totally unrelated. Productivity in the business world deals with the bottom line which is measured by cost effectiveness and producing a profit or breaking even for non-profits. We measure our costs in blood spilled and clotted. Leadership in business is often confused with management where resources, including people, are manipulated to acheive the goals of profit production. Soldiers are not resources for consumption but cogs in the gear box of a complex, dynamic, living entity that consumes resources provided for the accomplishment of a multitude of tasks focused by an over arching strategy enabled by leaders who do not separate men from mission but enmesh themselves in seamless web of actions to enable their troops to succeed 24/7.

To digress back a little to a previous post here.

Interestingly enough somewhere in the vicinity of 60% of 18X contracts are being signed by the kid who walks into the recruiting office and after taking the ASVAB is informed that he qualifies for SF.

Often this spiel goes on to say..."we currently have the 18X contract on a quick-ship bonus, if you ship in three weeks we can give you a $40k bonus."

"So....what's SF exactly?" says the prospect

"Oh it's just high speed infantry, you'll love it"

A large majority of 18X contracts are signed under pressure to meet mission from on high and ship with-in a few weeks. Again not knocking USAREC, just a reality of the machine, but is it the right machine for the 18X contract?

I think I may have already bashed this opinion here a little bit but, the 18X program is given to generic USAREC recruiters, who are fundamentally equipped to find the 18 -20 year olds with little direction in life. Does that sound like an SF candidate to you? (Seriously, this is a paraphrase of the USAREC demographic statement).

The 18X contract has unique benefits that can attract excellent candidates if it was just proactively marketed. Currently it is not marketed at all and therefore generally only the standard USAREC demographic is exposed to it. Not blaming anyone here, it’s just classic corporate syndrome.

Somewhere around 50% of 18X contracts are bowing out of their 18X contract during Basic.

I'd be interested to see the stats on the core buying motive of the 250 odd 18X recruits graduating from SFAS each year. As Longwire pointed out I imagine many of them have yet to realize the history and honor they’re about to step into, instead they only recognize the ‘cool’. Good on them for getting selected mind you, but….

PS.com has been lobbying lower and middle management at USAREC to change this and ears are beginning to listen. We'll see….

Thoughts, we need more 18D, why not advertise into pre-med colleges and EMT outfits and guarantee them 18D in their contract (like ARNG)
We could find some great 18C at the local Carpenter Unions. Some evidence shows that Language students and International Studies students have a tendency to enlist 18X. Yet non efforts are being made to prospect these demographics.

20-25% of 18X have at least a degree a significant percentage of prospects I talk to are in college, would an ROTC type program increase the enlistment of these gentlemen?

Interested on thoughts from QPs

Scimitar

It seems we were working with different definitions of motivation. Organizational Studies literature doesn't distinguish between the internal force/effort to act and morale, which while different, is related to motivation. I used the word motivation to describe both processes. After reviewing your comments, it appears we more or less agree after translating the definition of motivation.

Initial thought: Is there a specific reason that blood spilled may not be considered a cost to creation of inputs, and the result of the battle/mission be considered the revenue? I surmise you may argue it’s because measurements of costs and benefits are very difficult, but were you not faced with decisions where you could expect if missions were attempted that lives would be lost, and still decided to move forward with the mission? It would seem to me that simply because you are making a decision with the costs being lives instead of money isn’t reason enough to dismiss attempting to apply business concepts to the military.

Tangential thoughts: I think I understand your resistance to productivity measurements at what seems to be a more micro level analysis and the problems associated with valuation of the inputs and outcomes, but I do believe the use of productivity measurements in “the military” may be more macro than you stated.

Like many other public organizations, the military produces a public good that is both non-excludable (all citizens in the US receive national defense) and non-rival (one citizen's consumption of national defense does not reduce the amount of national defense for others). The production of this public good, and the different factors that affect it (including politics), is what we are discussing. This method of thinking, of taking private sector ideas and translating them for the public sector to create an applicable model which includes a focus on productivity, were constructed by Mark Moore at the Kennedy school and have since been, more or less, accepted by Public Policy academia. (For more information on Public Goods, see Moore's book http://www.amazon.com/Creating-Publi...4337347&sr=1-2)

While I do accept that applying a Profit = Total Revenue - Total Cost does not work, as valuing revenue and costs in the military becomes quite difficult, the military does utilize a modified model of Cost-Benefit Analysis. I'm sure you know this far better than me (I believe many of these changes were being implemented during your service in the military), but the Pentagon in the early 1960s implemented the Planning Programming Budget System (PPBS). (see McCaffery and Jones of the Naval Postgraduate school for more information) Essentially, PPBS was designed to measure how a budgetary input decisions impact production (output), and the results (outcomes). My impressions from readings on this topic is that while the budget didn’t value American lives lost, it attempted to value weapons, which to some degree involved valuing the effectiveness of a weapon, and therefore its ability/extent to injure or kill the enemy. I believe the valuation of these inputs is also considered with respect to redundancy, through the use of the JSOP and QDR, among others (correct me if wrong).

It would seem to me that you may counter by describing this macro-system is simply part of the management process, and that once the results of these processes and interactions reach Special Forces, leadership becomes more important to successfully complete missions (outputs) and their resulting impacts (outcomes). I’m still left a little confused by the distinction of management and leadership, especially after you mentioned that management included the manipulation of people (I would have considered that leadership, as it strikes me as a soft skill). I’d be interested in learning if you believe your commentary applies unconditionally in the military, or if it was intended for certain perspectives or situations in the military. And after considering all this, there is the consideration from the start - how does the president affect this production of national defense?

I can only translate your messages based on my experience (essentially none – I’m 23) and education. I am, however, trying my best to keep up with you and actually understand it, so I can recall and use it if I am fortunate enough to make it through OCS and become an MI officer in the army.

Stu